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"FAIR" COMPENSATION AND THE
ACCOMMODATION POWER: ANTIDOTES
FOR THE TAKING IMPASSE IN LAND
USE C ONTROVERSIES
JOHN J. COSTONIS*
"Dinah'll miss me very much tonight, I should think." (Dinah
was the cat.) ...."Dinah, my dear! I wish you were doivn here
with me! There are no mice in the air, I'm afraid, but you might
catch a bat, and that's very like a mouse, you knoiv. But do cats
eat bats, I wonder?" And here Alice b egan to get rather sleepy, and
went on saying to herself, in a dreamy sort of way, "Do cats eat
bats? Do cats eat bats?" and sometimes, "Do bats eat cats?" for,
you see, as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't much matter
which way she put it.
Lewis Carroll1
Present commentary on the taking issu e in land use controversies evokes
the spectacle of the circus equestrian, feet planted on two charging stallions.
Engrossed, the audience ponders what might happen if the stallions abruptly
lurch off in opposite directions. Can the rider keep the beasts in tow? Will
he tumble to the ground as penalty for his poor horsemanship? Or will he
finesse his dilemma by leaping to one or the other of the miscreants?
Like the bedeviled horseman, government stands shakily astride the
police and eminent domain powers as it seeks to give direction in land use
affairs. Sadly for government, the horseman's treacherous plight is as child's
* Visiting Professor of Law, Boalt Hall; Professor of Law, University of Illinois
College of Law. A.B. 1959, Harvard College; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University.
For their review and comments on earlier drafts of this article, the author wishes
to express his thanks to Dean John Cribbet and Professors Roger Findley, John Nowak
and Thomas Morgan---colleagues at the University o f Illinois College of Law-to Pro
fessors Donald Hagman and Harvey Goldschmid and to Chicago realtor-land economists
Jared Shlaes and Robert De Voy. Homage is also due to Messrs. Shlaes and De Voy for
their invaluable aid as co-authors in earlier undertakings with the author, see note 168
infra, conceiving of and investigating the feasibility of specific development rights trans
fer proposals as resource protection tools. The thesis advanced in this article traces
to these undertakings and to the patient efforts of Messrs. Shlaes and De Voy to initiate
the author into the mysteries of land economics and real estate appraisal. Finally, a special
and much-deserved note of thanks is due Diane Zimmerman, Columbia Law Review Ar
ticles Editor, for her superb editorial assistance in the preparation of the final version of
this article. Errors and distortions in this article, of course, are solely those of the author.
1. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 4 (Grossett
& Dunlap, Inc. ed. 1946).
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to agree only that something must be done to avoid

t he otherwise 1nev1table

fall.
Deadlock is the inexorable outcome of the tak ing issue so portrayed
because the legitimate interests of government and of pr i vale landown ers
cannot both be accommodated within this taut framework. The

thesis of this

article is, therefore, that the framework must be enlarged to introduce

a

third power, the acconunodation power, to fill the void that currently divides
the police and eminent domain powers.

vVithin this

enlarged ira111ework, the

concept of "fair compensation" serves as an i ntermediary bet ween the police
power's absence of compensation and the eminent domain puwn 's requ ire



ment of "just compensation."
Fundamental to this thesis 1s the belief that, by c a stin g the police and
eminent domain powers as correlatives,

the phrase

"

t a k ing- issue" is

a

mis

nomer that accords neither with logic, legal doc tri ne nor sound policy. \\'ith
rare exception, regulatory measures said to be tak in gs are simply measures
which exceed the allowable limits of the police power. Nor does it follow that
the cure to this problem lies exclusively in eminent domain. which r equ ires ,
in most states, that dollar compensation be fixed by a condemnation jury
according to a "highest and best use'' standard.2 Instead, government may
take one of three paths. Eminent domain is, of course, one solution, b ut

government will seldom opt for it because it is often
both fiscally impracti
cable and too drastic for the modest regulat
ory purposes at hand. It can
retrench to the police power by liberal
izing the overly restric tive measure,
often at the cost, however, of compr
omising the measure's intended planning
result. Or, under the thesis advanced in
this article it mav avoid that result
,
'
by predicating the measure on the
accommodation power and affordi ng the
landowner fair comp ensat ion. Less
dema nding than just comp
ensation, fair
_
compensation
may be secured by dollars or
b y some non-dollar but marketworthy alternative; it may
bypass the jury tria l and
. .
othe r proced ura 1 com.
.
ple 1ttes pres n ed for emm
ent domain acti ons by
state stat utes and constitut10ns; and 1t 1s not key
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2. See notes 76-110 and accompan
ying text
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but to a standard based on a lesser economic return, designated in this article
as the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard.
The accommodation power's differences from the two existing powers
and its role in public governance generally are best understood not by some
abstract definition of its quiddities, but by what it enables government to do
better than either of these other powers. From this perspective, I view it as
a vehicle for fair compensation, and I advance it only because fair compen
sation cannot find a predicate in either of the traditional powers, at least as
conventionally understood. Were it otherwise, I would have been pleased to
avoid the cutting edge of Occam's Razor, which advises against needless mul
tiplication of concepts, and to take the less exposed route of folding fair
compensation into one of the existing powers. In fact, an argument can be
made that it could find a home in the much enlarged police power of contem
porary times. 3 Nonetheless, I have chosen t o use the accommodation power
label because, in addition to my belief that it is conceptually necessary, it
also dramatizes both the inadequacies of current police power/eminent domain
doctrine and the fruitlessness of the debate now raging between police power
enthusiasts and private market adherents over the future course of land use
governance in America.
By breaking the logjam stymying current doctrine and debate, the ac
commod ation power opens the way to a land use system that can effect strin
gent public governance where necessary while, at the same time,

dealing

equitably with those landowners who are sharply disadvantaged by that gov
ernance. My argument is developed in three sections. The first critiques the
viewpoints of commentators who urge undue reliance respectively on either
the police or the eminent domain power as the foundation of public land use
governance. Extensive consideration is given to both schools in the convic
tion that their all-or-nothing proclivities best illustrate the underlying ten
sions that beset compensation jurisprudence today. The second details the
unhappy consequences and multiple ironies of that jurisprudence.

Singled

out for special discussion is the evolution of eminent domain doctrines de
fining the highest and best use standard as the polestar of just compensation.
This development, though intended to protect private rights, has instead all
but guaranteed government's recourse to the police power in situations where
that power's use not only is unfair but tends overall to defeat the successful
implementation of public governance schemes. The third section offers a
functional analysis of fair compensation and its accommodation power predi
cate, addressing both the relationship between that power and the Reasonable
Beneficial Use standard and the institutional a rrangements that its employ
ment requires.

3. See text accompanying notes 152-67, 175-85

infra.
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THE POLICE POWER ENTHUSIASTS AND THE PRIVATE MARKETEERS:
A COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE

A.

The Police Power Enthusiasts4
". . . [A] regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid

public purpose, can never constitute a taking."5 So write the authors of The
Taking Issue in their common drive with other police power enthusiasts to
be rid of the irritant of compensation which attends stern land use regulation.
The assumption of these authors that any regulation stopping short of actual
physical appropriation may be founded exclusively on the police power is

a

noble sentiment, superficially appealing at a time of widespread despair over
the destructive legacy of ill-regulated private development. Regrettably, how
ever, it pays little heed to the fairness or feasibility of achieving sound land
management on a wholly uncompensated basis.
The economic consequences of noncompensatory regulation are disdained
as a "matter of indifference"6 or ignored altogether, thereby shunting aside
considerations of fairness to private landowners who become forced contrib
utors to the common weal, and to government when its actions create wind
falls it cannot recover under existing practices. Positions assumed to be anti
thetical, moreover, often are not. We are told, for example, that belief in the
continued vitality of compensation practice commits one to the "myth" that
"the taking clause protects this right of unrestricted land use regardless of
its impact on society,"7 or, what may be the same thing, to the view that
"ownership of property necessarily implies a government guarantee to profit
from it when and as the owner in his sole discretion wishes .
strawmanship9 only

.

.

. "8

Their

detracts from the commentators' otherwise thoughtful

appreciation of failing governmental leadership in land use affairs and of
emerging attitudinal and doctrinal trends that promise to modify the nation's
long-standing bias unduly favoring private rights.
Nor do they choose to address the repeated failure of police power-based
4. That less space is devoted in text to a critique of the police power enthusiasts'
position than to that of the private markete ers' is not reflective of the writer's assessment
of the relative � erits of the two positions. Instead, �t is explained by his earlier preparation
.
of lengthy critiques
of the former, see Costoms, Transferable Development Rights:
Perspectii1cs for the Future at 57 passim (ASPO PAS Report No. 304 Mar. 1975):
Costonis, Deve�opme11t Rights Transfer: 4n Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 82-85
(1973), as a gainst the absenc� of a� eqm yalently con;ipreh�nsive critique by the writer
.
or other commentators of the mcreasmgly mftuent1al v1ewpomt of the private markete ers
in land use affairs.
5. _F. BosSELMAN, D. CALLIES & ]. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TAKI NG].
6. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 172 (1971).
7. TAKI NG, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Sax, supra note 6, at 169.
9. There _is, of course. a ral?ge of positions intermediate between those of the police
power enthusiasts and of the private marketeers. See generally text a ccompanying notes
125-30 infra; cf. text accompanying notes 211-29 infra.
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controls to tame discordant market forces. The sorry record of the last half
century is plain for those who care to read i t . In mockery of well-intentioned
police power programs, cherished landmarks fall, prime agricultural land and
open space vanish, s prawl compounds, and comprehensive land use plans un
ravel. Disregarded b y police power enthusiasts are stubborn political and
administrative obstacles, frequently traceable to market forces, that cannot
be dissipated by deft legal argument or by appeal to the intrinsic rightness
of proper land management practice.
Wishful thinking also seduces the enthusiasts into overreading land use
portents. Much has been written in recent years, for example, about "new
moods," "quiet revolutions," and other myth-destroying trends that foretell
better days ahead. Only the most obdurate cynic, of course, can doubt that
American land use attitudes, institutions and practices are indeed i n ferment .
But he might properly observe that while the conception of property rights
nurtured by William Blackstone, Adam Smith and John Locke is now sus
pect, no firm consensus has yet crystallized to take its place. The zig-zag
fortunes of innovative land use measures in such j urisdictions as New Y ork,10
Oregon,11 Vermont12 and Puerto Rico13 manifest that the pendulum has not
and is not likely to swing over toward a consensus supporting noncompen
satory regulation regardless of its economic impacts. Oregon Ex-Governor
Tom McCall adverted to the self-defeating tensions that indiscriminate police
power programs have g.enerated in these and other jurisdictions when he
opined in 1974 that compensatory zoning was the nation's "next great land
related issue."H
Also regrettable is the penchant of these advocates for shoehorning the
complexities of the compensation question into a single box and then resolving
them by sweeping formulae. The Taking Issue quotation that opens this sec
tion affords one example. Professor Sax offers another in his proposition that
"the only appropriate question in determining whether or not compensation is
due is whether an owner is being prohibited from making a use of his land
10. Compare Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1972) (sustaining restrictions on subdivision development for up to 18 years ) , witli
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) ( invalidating landmark designation of the J.P. Morgan Mansion as
a "taking"); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N ew York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973) ( invalidating the Tudor Parks protective transferable
development rights prog ram as a "taking " ) ; and Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of
New York, Index No. 14763/69 ( Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1975) (inval idating landmark
designation of Grand Central Terminal as a "taking'').
11. See Williams, Oregon: The Fight for "Survival," SATURDAY REVIEW WoRLD 1,
Nov. 16, 1974.
12. See Trillin, U.S. Journal: Vermont, Act 250 and Beyond, 50 NEW YORKER, Oct.
1974, at 128.
13. See J. CosT ONIS & R. DE VoY, THE P uERTO Rico PLAN : ENVIRONMENTAL PRO
TECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (Conservation Trust of Puerto
Rico & Urban Land Institute 1975) [hereinafter cited as PUERTO Rico PLAN].
14. Address by Tom McCall, Governor, State of Oregon, Middle Atlantic Regional
Conference, Mar. 29, 1974, on file at the Columbia Law Review.

·
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which is, above all, a law of contexts.
ing rod areas as diverse as
shrink from confronting with a single measur
ve zoning, aircraft overflight ,
incenti
growth management resource protection,
and these are only a
interim zoning and nonconforming use amortization;
te the compensation
few of the contexts whose unique features so complica
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resolve
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adequate
question. Nor would he find that yardstick
an entire
issues whose outcome in a half-century of litigation has turned upon
matrix of variables, each of shifting weight depending upon context and cur
rent community values.17
B.

The Private Marketeers
At the opposite pole from the police power advocates are those com

mentators who repose their faith in the marketplace and not in government
as the regulator of land use affairs. As adherents of an economic philosophy
associated principally with the University of

Chicago, they would compel

government to compensate when it regulates all but nuisance-like land uses.
But their support for the eminent domain power instead of the police power
is only a by-product of their more fundamental conviction that government
ought largely to get out of the land use field, a conviction mirrored in Professor
Ellickson's argument that "zoning is today out of control and must be severely
curtailed if not entirely replaced."18 Building on the work of Bernard Siegan1 9
and other private market adherents,20 Ellickson proposes a substitute founded
on the "laissez-faire distribution of property rights," which he defines as "an
imaginary legal world where each landowner can choose to pursue any activity
within the boundaries of his parcel without fear of liability to his neighbors or
governmental sanction."21 Recognizing that some forms of land use do injure
neighboring landowners, he also proposes that these harms be "internalized"
to their authors by three devices: first, expanded use of private bargaining

15. Sax, supra note 6, at 164.
��· Js�i lbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691,
696 9 .
u
of the variables re. �ected in 20.th
Cent��� FX�:r��������I u�� jue:;����d:��e i�t:;Pm���1�
"]
a Propert'l, ,l/tility,
and Fairncss: Co111111c11ts on the Ethical Foundations of
t Compensation
Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 11�5 passim (I 967).
18. Elhckson, A ltcrnatives to Zoning· C
n t[� N1;'1S nce �itles and Fines .as Land
Use Co11trols, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681 73'1 c197'.B
erema'fter cite� as Alternatives].
19. See B. SIEGAN LAND UsE WITHOUT zONING
(1972); S1egan, Non-Zoning in
Ho1t.Slo11, 13 ]. LA :V & 'E'.coN 71 0970).
.
20. See authorities
cited m Alternatives' supra note 18, at 682 n.2.
21. Id. at 684.
us

·

\

•.
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arrangements m which landowners purchase from their neighbors the right
to conduct nuisance uses ;22 second, revitalization of nuisance law to penalize
nuisance-perpetrating freeloaders ;23 and, third, recognition of a limited role
for government in dealing with "pervasive nuisances," (those that are not
amenable to resolution by the first two devices) .24 The pervasive nuisance
class is apparently quite limited and includes, in his representative listing, such
matters as signs, building heights, overhead utility lines, offstreet parking, and
yard, setback and subdivision requirements.25 Government's role would be
two-fold. It would administer a system of fines against pervasive nuisances
whose degree of "noxiousness" can be objectively plotted.26 And it would
adopt mandatory r egulations akin to conventional zoning measures to bar
pervasive nuisances of indeterminate noxiousness.27
The private m arketeers' position is provocative and, in many respects,
enlightening. They see clearly what the police power enthusiasts choose to
ignore and vice-versa. Foremost among their concerns is public governance's
haphazard economic consequences. Hence, Bernard Siegan's quote from Mason
Gaffney: "When the planning commission and the zoning board flit about
sprinkling little golden showers here rather than there, they make millionaires
out of some and social reformers of others."28 Then too, they highlight the
role of compensation in protecting individual liberty29 and encouraging ra
tional decision-making by exposing the true costs of collective judgments that
impose severe charges on a few or afford benefits unequal to their costs.30 Also
welcome is their attention to the various private and quasi-private arrange
ments that contribute to efficient land use patterns while escaping many of
zoning's well-known drawbacks.81
Unfortunately, these valuable insights are all but cancelled out by two
grave deficiencies. First is their jaundiced view of the propriety of public
governance in appropriate land use contexts. Second-and correlative to the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 711-19.
at 719-61.
at 761-79.

at 761.
at 761-62.
Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & Eco N. 71, 128 (1970).
Sec A. DUNHAM, PROPERTY, CITY PLANNING, AND LIBERTY IN LAW AND LAND,
28 passim (Haar ed. 1964). Given Professor Dunham's status as Chief Reporter of the
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT (ODE, an instrument which calls for increased rather
than less centralized planning, it may seem anomalous to classify him with the , priva:te
marketeers. As Professor Ellickson properly notes, however, Professor Dunham s writ
ings place him "[a]mong the most distinguished and persistent .. . s�eptics" of the
"wisdom of greater governmental intervention in land markets." Alternatives, supra note
18, at 682 n.6.
30. See A. DUNHAM, supra note 29, at 40, 43; Dunham, From Rt"al Enclosure to
Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1 238, 1253-54 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Enclosure].
31. See generally Alternatives, supra note 18; B. SlEGAN, LAND UsE WITHOUT

ZONING (1972).
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first-is their indef ensibly broad conception of private property rights. These
deficiencies are treated in the following two subsections.

l.

The Marketplace as a Regulator of Urban Growth. To this observer,

the market's capacity to insure orderly urban growth without a framework of
publicly determined goals and incentives is highly problematic. Perhaps the
market is superior to zoning in resolving localized conflicts among neighboring
landowners. But is it also superior to zoning and other forms of public gov
ernance in dealing with larger questions, such as growth management ? Profes
sor Ellickson believes so, arguing as follows:
If a particular area becomes too dense, its residents will perceive
the disadvantages of this high density and tend to leave; growth con
trols are thus not needed to protect people from "unlivable" condi
tions. When conditions are unlivable for many residents, emigration
will reduce population densities and tend to establish equilibrium. If
California's attractiveness as a place to live were to diminish because
of rapid population growth and the resulting additions t o traffic con
gestion and air pollution, private forces would end net migration to
California ; population planning is not necessary to accomplish this
result.32
But his argument raises more questions than it resolves. Contrary to the
assumption that pervades his and Siegan's work, zoning does not exhaust
public governance; it is only one of a variety of planning tools, a point which
is implicit in his reference to transportation, pollution and other concomitants
of urban growth. Properly framed, the issue shifts to the comparative merits
of zoning and other forms of public governance working in conjunction with
market forces, versus the unregulated marketplace as the proper determinant
of this growth. Again, while zoning is not the whole of public governance,
it is certainly more than a nuisance-preventative. True, its field of operation
does encompass such matters as compatibility of neighboring uses, yard and
setback requirements, building heights and the like. To stop there, however,
is to ignore modern zoning potential, either independent of or coordinated

with other public governance devices, to deal affirmatively with a broad range
of positive concerns that, while hardly categorizable as "nuisanc
es," do serve
health, safety and welfare goals firmly based in evolving
community stan
dards.33
These rather obvious facts are passed over because
they jibe poorly with
a model founding efficient land use control on private
bargaining transactions
backsto� ped somewhat-but not too much- by
governmental machinery. More
than this anachronistic model is needed,
however, to deal with urban growth
and other non-local planning problems,
a point driven home by the California
32. Alternatives, supra note 18, at
769-70.
33. Sec generally ]. CosTONIS, SPACE
ADRIFT·. LANDMARK PRESE
RVATION AND THE
MARKETPLACE 162-66 (1974); D. HAGMA
N URBAN PLANNING
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW 86-99 (1971).
'
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Supreme Court in recounting the factors that led to the creation of the (Lake)
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
The water that the Agency is to purify cannot be confined within
one county or state; it circulates freely throughout Lake Tahoe. The
air which the Agency must preserve from pollution knows no political
boundaries. The wildlife which the Agency should protect ranges
freely from one local jurisdiction to another. Nor can the popu
lation and explosive development which threatens the region be
contained by any of the local authorities which govern parts of the
Tahoe Basin. Only an agency transcending local boundaries can de
vise, adopt and put into operation solutions for the problems besetting
the region as a whole. Indeed, the fact that the [Tahoe Planning
Agency] Compact is the product of the cooperative efforts and mu
tual agreement of two states is impressive proof that its subject mat
ter and objectives are of regional rather than local concern.34
The court's immediate object was to sustain the Compact against a charge
that it invaded the home rule ·powers of local governments. Where even local
governmental arrangements have fallen short of resolving growth problems,
however, the hope that private arrangements can do so seems

chimerical

indeed.
Unsatisfactory too is the glib solution to the overdensity problem ad
vanced by Professor Ellickson-that the community or the state need not be
alarmed because "private forces" will produce "equilibrium." However useful
the equilibrium concept may be for the economist, when transplanted to the
planning context it begs a number of questions vital to basic community values.
Why, for example, should the community or state meekly acquiesce in conges
tion, air pollution and the like when it could strive to anticipate and mitigate
these scourges? Suggested by the author are two related responses, both con
cededly based on his "intuitive estimates of the allocative and distributional
impacts of alternative internalization systems."35 First, the market is better
able than government to allocate resources efficiently.36 Second, successful
management of these problems is beyond the reach of existing public gov
ernance techniques and institutions in any event.3 7
If intuition is to be the guide, the first response surely rings false in its
application to the nation's air, water, and land resources. The cutting edge of

34. People er rel. Younger v. County of E l Dorado, 5 Cal. 3 d 480, 493-94, 487 P.Zd
1193, 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561 (1971).
35. Alternatives, supra note 18, at 781.
36. Id. passim.
37. As noted in the text accompanying note 42 infra, this point is not systematically
addressed through empirical investigation or proof by either Ellickson or Siegan, who
rely instead on an enumeration of public governance's abuses-most of which, incidentally,
are remediable through judicial processes-and on the tautology that since the market
is the best allocator of land resources, public governance is to be avoided whenever pos
sible. For an illustration of Professor Ellickson's skepticism concerning the capabilities
of public governance, see Alternatives, supra note 18, at 769 n.291.

[Vol.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1030

75:1021

ned by none other than
l movement, in f act, was ho
the current environmenta
rces effi .1en l r.as
marketplace to allocate these resou
the deplorable failu re of the
ar�umen t runs cleep r tha1 mtu1tion,
But my object ion to the efficiency
ency" itself. Effic ency 1s a we sel
"effici
reaching to the definition of the term
son, has all the consistency of quick
word which, as used by Professor Ellick
ics is the maximization of total
silver. Its orthodox signification in econom
choice based on calculations
benefit from the use of resources through private
the land use field, on the
of private benefit or utility. When transported to
variable of community
the
te
incorpora
to
expanded
be
other hand, it must
precedents and
judicial
legislation,
in
expressed
standards as authoritatively
acknowledges
explicitly
Ellickson
other pertinent sources, a point Professor
·

�
�

:

: �:
�

when he asserts that nuisance liability should attach to the "host landowner
only if [his proposed land use] is perceived as unneighborly according to

contemporary community standards."39
Expansion of the definition is necessary for at least two reasons. First,
the collective determination of efficiency in land use affairs involves value as
well as fact judgments, the former encompassing a range of considerations that
play little if any role in exclusively private calculations of private benefit. An
outcome that might be perceived as "efficient" by a mortgagee and his devel
oper may be quite the opposite if measured against such community objectives
as those affording the policy basis for establishing the Tahoe Regional Plan
ning Agency.
Second, a broadened concept of efficiency is required even at the factual
level because public agencies may not only be better situated than private
landowners to anticipate and assess the pertinent facts, but they may be the

only

entities in a position to do so. A case in point is the sorry plight of hun

dreds of purchasers of tract houses in Houston, a city lauded by Bernard Sie
gan for turning thumbs down on centralized planning and zoning That city's
.
unregulated growth has been so rapid in recent years that, to satisfy increased
water demands, groundwater has had to be pumped from under these tract
houses. The result:

their subsidence and destruction.40 That this wasteful
outcome would not be anticipated by specific subdividers and
their customers
is entirely predictable, given the complex planning and
civil engineerings fac
tors that were unlikely to come to the attention of
either-until it was too late.

Despite his apparent concession that commu
nity standards ought to play
a key role in controlling nuisance behavi
or, Professor Ellickson gives short
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shrift in his excerpt both to what these standards are, and to the foregoing
issues of value and fact determination. Land use, environmental quality and
community welfare--each the object of profound deference under contemporary
community standards-are delivered over to the tender mercies of the market
place with the Panglossian assurance that "equilibrium" will insure an opti
mum outcome. Far better advice, I'm afraid, is afforded in Ada Louise
Huxtable's warning that "if there were no other way than to let sound business
practice take its course, there would be little hope for the urban environment."41
The redwoods, prime agricultural lands, historic landmarks and general well
being of community residents in the buffeted area are not going t o reappear
magically when equilibrium sets in. Loss of some of these resources, such as
the redwoods and farmlands, will be total. Prospects for others, such as unique
urban environments that are the work of decades or centuries are little better.
The residents of the area that becomes "unlivable" through overdensity come
off badly as well. A r e the psychological and other attachments to the com
munity of those wealthy enough to leave t o be ignored? And what of the
market's legacy of scrambled land use patterns and a deteriorated environment
to those obliged by circumstance to stay behind?
To acknowledge these as serious problems is to recognize the need for
public governance in contexts where private choice deviates markedly from
community standards. Because such intervention is anathema to the marketeers'
a

priori dictates, however, these problems are largely ignored. To the extent

that they are perceived, public governance is dismissed as a means of dealing
with them on the formulistic basis that "city planning or public land use con
trols would only make matters worse from an efficiency standpoint."42 The
"proof" offered for this proposition consists of little more than recitation of
the abuses to which public governance is vulnerable.
This tautological reasoning is especially disappointing because the question
of public governance's capabilities is an important one meriting serious investi
gation. For the time being at least, it must b e viewed as several steps short of
conclusive. Establishing that public governance is subject to abuse proves
neither that it is inherently unserviceable in its present or an upgraded form
nor that the market alternative is itself free o f abuse. Indeed, if the question
is to turn on abuse, the marketeers surely have the worse of the argument!
Only those blind to the market's dismal record as a deterrent to orderly growth
would argue that public governance is its equal in this respect, however mis
conceived that governance may be. In the a bsence of persuasive evidence of
public governance's inherent inadequacies, m y own inclination is to deal with
its conceded abuses b y upgrading that governance. If sound land use manage-

§ 2

41. Huxtable, What's Best for Business Can Ravage Cities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1975,
(Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 6.
42. Alternatives, supra note 18, at 683.
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ment should in fact be shown to exceed the capabilities of public governance, I
too would fall back on the market. My reasoning, however, would not be that
the market will make things better-a position that, frankly, is absurd in view
of the market's track record over this century-but rather that public gov
ernance will only make them worse.
z.

Nuisance:

A Dubious Criterion of Private Property Rights. Under

Professor Ellickson's proposed "laissez faire distribution of private property
rights," all economic expectancies associated with property ownership other
than those of a nuisance-creating variety are the property of the landowner.
Nuisances excepted, government must compensate when its regulation frus
trates any of these expectancies, and that compensation presumably would be
keyed to the difference between the market values of the parcel before and
after regulation. It is no understatement that, were these prescriptions con
stitutionally compelled, public governance as we know it today would cease
forthwith. This result, of course, would sit well with the marketeers whose
view on the eminent domain question is essentially a stalking horse for their
dogmatic opposition to public interference in private land markets.
While they certainly can't be faulted for lack of chutzpah in their attempt
to resurrect the property conceptions of Blackstone, Smith and Locke, they
come off less well on social policy grounds. As pointed out in the previous
subsection, once community standards are introduced as a determinant of
efficiency, the field of licit public regulation is necessarily and substantially
enlarged beyond the ambit described by conventional nuisance law. This is
not to endorse The Taking Issue's claim that compensation is never required
for regulatory measures that further community standards, but only to under
score that entitlement to compensation should be determined by a yardstick
less favorable to the private landowner than the nuisance criterion.
The marketeers' view of property rights is outmoded on another count
in these times of extensive publicly-initiated capital improvements projects
and regulatory programs, namely, in its insistence that the economic expectan
cies associated with the ownership of land ought always to be regarded as the
"property" of the owner. To test out this proposition, suppose that, in im
plementing community standards favoring the retention of one sector of a
town in residential use, government zones out motel and commercial uses
there. Then, suppose government also decides to build a highway alongside
this and an adjoining sector. The effect of these decisions is to quadruple the
value of Farmer Brown's 50-acre tract in the latter sector

i

which he is now

profitably farming. Because of the highway, the market antic pates that Farmer
Bro

':n's �ract,

if upzoned from its present agricultural-low density residential

classification to a motel-commercial status, will be prized by national motel and
retail chains as a sitf' for their facilities. Should Farmer Brown be deemed to
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"own" the economic expectancies that government initiated by its zoning of
the residential sector and its decision to build the highway? Stated another
way, if commercial-motel uses on Farmer Brown's tract are not "nuisances,"
ought he to be able to prevail in an inverse condemnation action for frustrated
economic expectancies if government refuses to upzone his land ?
For Professor E llickson, the answer apparently is a confident "yes." But
is the matter really that simple? If these expectancies are created through no
effort of Farmer Brown, why should they be deemed his "property" ? Again,
if the marketeers are solicitous of landowners disadvantaged by the uneven
distributional impact of land use controls, should they be so hasty to endorse a
rule that mulcts government for the dubious end of providing Farmer Brown
a windfall? And, as a corollary to the second question, if allowing government
to recoup some.portion of Farmer Brown's unearned increment would provide
it with the resources to deal fairly with those landowners who are disadvan
taged by public regulation,48 is it defensible to bar this outcome by an approach
that limits noncompensatory governmental intervention to the narrow sphere
of nuisance control? Doctrinaire economic theory diverts the marketeers from
paying serious attention to these questions despite intimations in their com
mentary suggesting less than a negative response to them.44 For the time
being, however, their position must be read to disagree with R. W. G. Bryant's
observation that "there are various and different concepts of government, but
it could not reasonably be suggested that it is a proper function of government
to take a minority of its citizens for a free ride. "45

II.

THE POLICE AND EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS: OF CATS AND BATS

Despite their discordant outcomes, contenders in the public governance/
private rights debate begin with the common premise that the police and em
inent domain powers are correlatives. Responsible for that premise is Justice
Holmes' famous aphorism in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon that "the
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent
[under the police power ] , if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."46 His aphorism, coupled with both legislative inattention to the com
pensation problem and a conservative state j udiciary's elaboration of extrava
gant eminent domain doctrines, has contributed immeasurably to the impasse
43. One illustratio n of a technique employing this approach is transferable develop
ment rights. See text accom panying notes 168-72 infra.
44. For example, Professor Ellickson apparel}tly approves the transferable develop
ment rights technique in prin ciple; see text accompanying notes 168-72 infra, and Alter
natives, supra note 18, at 703. Professor Dunham approves of a system in which landowners
are charged for the increases in the value of their property attributable to public planning
schemes and compensated for losses attendant upo n such schemes; see Property, City
Planning and Liberty in LAW AND L AN D 28, 36-37 (Haar ed. 1964).
45. R. w. G. BRYANT, LAND: PRIVATE PROPERTY PUBLIC CONTROL 160 (1972).

46. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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that today stymies the evolution of a rational compensation practice in land use
controversies.
The impasse is by no means foreordained. In speaking but a half-truth,

�

the aphorism did not necessarily bar the way to the evolution of rational pra 
tice. Reinterpreted in light of settled precedent subsequent to Pennsylvania

Coal, Holmes' language offers no objection to the emergence of a power-the
accommodation power-which is intermediate between the police and eminent
domain powers and which, in providing fair compensation to meritorious
claimants, affords government a feasible alternative to the prohibitively expen
sive "j ust compensation. " Concurrent with and following Pennsylvania Coal,
moreover, the federal j udiciary not only laid the foundations for a less demand
ing body of eminent domain rules but for a re-evaluation of property concep
tions along lines that mesh fully with the accommodation power and fair
compensation theses advanced here.
These theses are treated in the following section. The concerns of this
section are, first, a brief explanation of why Holmes' aphorism tells only half
of the story ; second, an account of the disparate evolution of eminent domain
and related doctrines in the state and federal courts ; and third, a portrayal
of the multiple ironies characterizing compensation law at the present time.
A.

"Takings" That Are Not Takings
With the benefit of a half-century's hindsight, furnished principally by

land use litigation, the gold and the dross in the Holmes aphorism are readily
separated . The gold obviously is its recognition that some, indeed most forms
of regulation may be predicated on the police power. The dross i s his statement
that " . . . if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Both as
chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court47 and as an associ
ate justice of the U . S . Supreme Court,48 Holmes was deeply influenced by the
laissez-faire property notions of his day, and h e was not immune to overstate
ment in defending those notions. The quoted language is a clear case in point
because all that Pennsylvania Coal actually decided was that the statute chal
lenged in that case was an invalid police power measure, and not a literal taking.
Were that statute and the countless zoning measures that have been de
clared "takings" since Pennsylvania Coal truly exercises of the eminent do
main power, a very different result would attend a decision favoring the private
litigant. The very enactment of such measures would obligate government

�o pay j �st compensation and,

in return, government would receive a property

mtere t

�

m

Coal,

m

the challenger's less-than-fee holding.49 All such litigation, moreover,

the challenger's land or, under the special facts i n Pennsylvania

47. See text accompanying notes 235-5 1 infra
48. See . TAK!NG, supra note 5, at 125-28
, 240-46.
49. At issue m the case was whether
a state legislature could employ the police power
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would take the form of inverse condemnation actions. In reality, of course,
neither courts nor p rivate litigants visualize challenges to regulatory measures
in these terms. I nstead, the goal of this litigation in conventional land use
disputes is simply to preclude application of the measure to the restricted
parcel on the basis of its constitutional infirmity.60 What is achieved, in short,
is declaratory relief. The sole exception to this mild outcome occurs where the
challenged measure i s either intended to eventuate in actual public ownership
of the land or has already caused government to encroach on the land with
trespassory consequences that are largely irreversible.111
More significant for the purposes of this article is the aphorism's implica
tion that the police and domain powers are correlatives. Under the correlatives
model, the police power preempts the "regulatory" sphere as the tool for pur
suing community health, safety and welfare goals on a noncompensatory basis ;
it is constrained only by the constitutional test of "public purpose." The em 
inent domain power, i n its turn, is limited to outright appropriation of private
land on a compensated basis ; it is subject to the "public use" test which in
Holmes' time connoted actual physical use b y the public.52 What could not
be done under the police power had to be done under the eminent domain
power or not at all.
The position offered in this article d isputes the correlatives model on two
counts. First, a third power should be recognized, the accommodation power,
which furnishes an alternative to the eminent domain power for curing or
enacting regulatory measures that cannot be sustained under the police power.
Further discussion of this contention is deferred to the article's third section.
Second, doctrinal and policy developments since Pennsylvania Coal dictate
replacement of the correlatives model with arf approach under which the police
and eminent domain powers, along with the accommodation power, are per
ceived as functionally interchangeable tools-subj ect to constitutional com
pensation requirements-for achieving government's regulatory goals.113
to abrogate a deed restriction reserving mineral rights to the corporate grantor and im
munizing it from liability for subsidence damage resulting from its mining operations
below the deeded parcel.
SO. For a recent treatment of the point with an exhaustive collection of cases and
authorities, see Note, Inverse Condemnation: I ts A vailability in Challenging the Validity
of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 S TA N. L. REV. 1439 ( 1 974) . For the view that inverse con
demnation rather than declaratory relief should be available at the private challenger's
option, see, e.g., Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Ca1tse of A c tion,
S URBAN LAWYER 25 ( 1973 ) ; Enclosure, supra note 30. This contention was apparently
sustained by a Californ i a appellate court in the controversial decision, HFH Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 1 16 Cal. Rptr. 436 ( 1974) (semble ) ; ct. Brown v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 385 F. Supp. 1 1 28 ( 1 973). The Cahforma Supreme
Court has granted leave to appeal in HFH, and its r esolution of the question is imminent.
The general problem is r e-addressed in text accompanying notes 167, 21 1-29 infra.
51. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: . Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of
a Zoning Ordinance, supra note 50, at 1447.
52. The evolution and desuetude of the use-by-the-public test is recounted in Com
ment, The P1tblic Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599 (1949 ) .
53. Only the triad of t h e police, accommodation and eminent domain powers is treated

1036

[Vol. 75 :1021

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

government's broad
Judicial expansion of "publi c use" to comport with
correlatives model of
ened involvement in land use affairs has deprived the
Coal was decided.
w hatever validity it may have had at the time Pennsylvania
The demise of the narrow use-by- the-pub lic criterion54 removed the legal

objections that purportedly stood in the way of the eminent domain power's
employment for any legitimate regulatory purpose. As decisions approving its
6
employment for such varied purposes as historic preservation,55 zoning,5
comprehensive planning,57 and urban renewal58 signal, the public use limitation
now differs little, if at all, from the police power's public purpose test.
Despite these developments, the correlatives model continues to distort
understanding of the relationship that the police and eminent domain powers
bear to one another and to their common goal of regulation. Perhaps the
classic case in point is Berman v. Parker,59 a U.S. Supreme Court opinion
authored by Justice Douglas, that definitively confirmed that the Fifth Amend
ment's public use requirement is as a mple as the police power's public purpose
test. At issue in B erman was whether the District of Columbia's employment
of the eminent domain power to achieve various regulatory goals of its urban
renewal program comported with the public use criterion. Yet the reader is
puzzled to find as the opinion's lead analytical sentence Justice Douglas'
proposition that " [ w J e deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been
known as the police power."6° Confusion compounds in his reasoning, first,
1
that the eminent domain power is but a subcategory of the police power ; 6

second, that aesthetic goals may be a c hieved as freely under the police power
as under the eminent domain power ( despite the former's absence of compen
sation) ;62 and, finally, that " [ t] he rights of these property owners are satisfied
when they receive that j ust compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts
as the price of the taking. "63
in the text a� too�s by which government may pursue its regulatory goals because the
con.cern of this article is the inadequacy-functional ly and conceptual ly-of the traditional
police pow�r/em inent domain bifurcation. That government can employ other powers, such
as the taxmg P<;>wer, for this purpose is, of course, understood. See generally Costoni s,
Development Rights Transfer : An Ezploratory Essay 83 yALE L.J . 75 1 04-07 n. 1 1 0
( 1 973) .
5�. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain : An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 ( 1949) .
55. E.g., Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 ( 1 929) ; United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 99 F. ?upp. 71� (E.D. Pa. 1 95 1 ) , aff'd, 215 F.2d 140 ( 3d Cir. 1 954) .
. 56. E.g., Kansas City v. Kmdle, 446 S.W.2d 807 ( Mo. 1969) ; State ex rel. Twin
City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 1 44 Minn. 1 , 1 76 N.W. 1 59 ( 1 920
).
57. Cf. , �omm :mwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R.R. 488 ( 1967) ( sustaining the Puerto Rico
�
Land �dmm1str atton Act, P.R. LA�S ANN. tit. 23, § 7 ( 1 974) , which permits con
.
demnation of private land for an entire gamut of public governance purposes .
)
58. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 ( 1 954) Gohld Realty Co v City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 ( 1 954) .
59. 348 U.S. 26 ( 1954 ) .
60. Id. at 32.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 33, 34.
63. Id. at 36.
'

·
'

'
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Taken literally the opinion makes little sense. If the police power-<on
ventionally defined as noncompensatory regulation-possesses the remarkable
attributes claimed for it, why was it necessary for Justice Douglas to qualify
these claims with the concluding proviso concerning compensation ? Again,
what does it mean to reduce the eminent domain power to peonage as a
subcategory of the police power ?
Given the opinion's expansion of the public use concept, a second 'inter
pretation of Justice Douglas' reasoning, one that comports with the logic
though not the labels of my proposed substitute for the correlatives model,
is plausible.64 Under this interpretation, the Court's use of the phrase "police
power" connotes the full range of government's legislative powers,65 and
makes that phrase equivalent to my term "regulation." So conceived, J ustice
Douglas' treatment of the police power as an umbrella power implementable
by various subordinate powers--or, better yet, by tools such as eminent do
main-is identical with my use of "regulation" as a genus including among
its species the police, accommodation and eminent domain powers. As much
is implicit in Justice Douglas' observation that " [ o] nee the object [of a chal
lenged legislative program] is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of
eminent domain is merely the means to the end . "66
Despite the functional equivalence of my framework and the one offered
in Berman, my nomenclature is employed in this article for several reasons.
However the Supreme Court may use those terms, other courts have consis
tently treated the police and eminent domain powers as co-equal in status ;
for them, the police power has a narrower meaning-i.e., noncompensatory
regulation-than for Justice Douglas. The transition from this settled under
standing to the Douglas framework would not b e frictionless ; this is pointed
up by the frequent mis-citation of Berman as a precedent approving the sweep
ing use of noncompensatory regulation to achieve aesthetic goals, regardless
of the costs to private owners.67 To add further to the confusion, if the Douglas
nomenclature were adopted, a new name would then have to be invented for
that tool which the state courts currently call the "police power." With the
addition by this article of the phrase "accomm odation power" and with the
ambiguous meaning of "police power," introducing yet another term seems in
advisable.
64. I am indebted to my colleague, Jolm Nowak, for this suggestion.
65. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54 ( 1905) ; West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 ( 1 937) ; Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
529 ( 1959) .
66. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 ( 1954) ( emphasis added) .
67. See, e.g., Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 1 18, 121 (10th
Cir. 1973 ) , cert. denied, 417 U . S. 932 ( 1 974); City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 413 F.2d 762, 767 ( 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 ( 1 969) ; cf. Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5 ( 1974) (Douglas J.) .
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invalidat
must
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domain plank to
gether-thereby forcing government to walk the eminent
Taking Issue are
The
of
readers
the
secure its desired planning outcome. A s

well aware, the courts have increasingly opted for the first solution. But it is
my judgment that this choice is less the product of the courts' embrace of a

"new mood" i n land use law than of sober recognition that acquiescence in
the legislative body's use of the police power is simply the lesser of two evils.

Eminent domain, they rightly appreciate, is often neither a realistic nor a

fitting corrective for overbroad police power regulation. As even an old-mood
court stated with rare candor in upholding a nonconforming use amorti zation
measure :
The effectiveness of eminent domain is restricted by the necessity that
the purchase must be for public use, by the complexities of adminis
trative procedures and by the high cost of reimbursing the property
owners.68
How did this polarity come about ? An excellent clue is found in Mendes
Hershman's plaint that "we have condemnation concepts and procedures which
developed in an agrarian society prior to the middle of t h e 1 9th Century,
which we are trying to fit into an urban society in a vastly different economy ."69
Little need and even less sympathy for stringent land use regu lation was to be
found in laissez-faire, 1 9th Century America. Eminent domain's function then
was perceived as compen sating landowners for the outright appropriation of
their land for the condemnor's affirmative use ; it was not seen as a curative
for overly stringent land use controls.70 Because this power was delegated to

and often abused by such powerful private condemnors as the railroads, more
o er, nu ero s state constitutional and statutory safeguards
were adopted to
circumsc ribe its use.71 Elaborate procedu ral requirem
ents, includin g manda

:
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tory use of juries to ascertain condem nation
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<lards were jealously construed, both to limit the instances in which the em
inent domain power could be employed and to enlarge condemnation awards.
With the leap forward of public land use governance in the 20th Century,
a corresponding shift in eminent domain doctrine was necessary to transform
condemnation into a feasible tool for mitigating often harsh private impacts
of that governance. But l egislatures largely ignored the need for change and
the state courts modified only the public use concept. Because there was no
equivalent easing of eminent domain's procedural strictures and just compen
sation rules, expanding the public use concept only exacerbated the problem :
it was futile to invite government to employ eminent domain to soften stern
regulatory measures and then impose conditions on its exercise which placed
it beyond government's reach. Little will be said here about its continuing
procedural complexities other than to note that the federal judiciary ruled long
ago that nothing in the federal constitution requires government to be ham
strung with the j ury requirement found in many state constitutions and stat
utes.75 Instead, the targets of this discussion are two doctrines,

largely

judicially evolved, that flesh out the just compensation requirement. The first
mandates that compensation be paid in dollars. The second, that it be measured
by a highest and best u s e standard. Of particular concern will be the grudging
way that state courts have reformulated that standard to take account of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Com
pany,76 a decision which dethroned the market-oriented highest and best use
standard as the determinant of permissible noncompensatory public interven
tion into private land markets.

1 . Just Compensation as Dollar Compensation. Government has scarce
dollar resources to offset the private impact of public regulation. As allocator
and, frequently, outright creator of lucrative development opportunities, on
the other hand, government has at its disposal a substantial pool of non
dollar but marketworthy compensatory alternatives that could be devoted to
this purpose. This possibility is currently overlooked, in part becaus e of the
just compensation doctrines discussed below and in part because of a refusal
to acknowledge that land regulation's fiscal consequences are as direct and
significant as its physical development objects. It has also been stillborn be
cause, to put it bluntly, private enrichment of u nscrupulous public officials and
favored landowners siphons off much of the wealth that would otherwise be
available to equalize t h e gains and losses that attend public regulation.
Though the fact i s widely ignored, the Fifth Amendment's j ust compen
sation requirement allows sufficient latitude to legitimize non-dollar compen
sation in the borderline situation where overly stringent public regulation is
75. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 ( 1897) ; see generally Blair, Federal Con
demnatio n Proceedings and the Seventh Amendment, 4 1 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1927).
76. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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declared to be a "taking." Since what would be condemned in these borderline
cases if a literal taking were to occur would be a less-than-fee interest in the
burdened parcel, non-dollar compensation in the form of " special benefits"
could be used to offset amounts due the condemnee both for the less-than-fee
interest taken and for any damages to the parcel remaining.77 As to the other
two factors, nothing short of a fundamental transformation of prevailing atti
tudes will overcome them as obstacles to acceptance of the non-dollar com
pensation position advanced here. A measure of the persistence of these fac
tors is the tenor of the "taking" debate itself, in which the contending sides
pay little heed to resolution through economic trade-offs leveraged on govern
ment's role as initiator and allocator of development opportunities, but urge
instead the harsh extremes outlined earlier. Until the fiscal side of the public
governance coin enjoys the attention that so far has been monopolized by its
physical development side, the debate will remain barren, and the abuses
cloaked by the present one-dimensional perception of public governance will
continue to fester.78
The issue of whether or not j ust compensation must be paid in dollars
has been ventilated most frequently in the partial taking context adverted to
above. If the parcel remaining increases in value as a result of the public
improvement that necessitated the taking, may government deduct this incre
ment from the compensation otherwise payable for the portion taken ? This
question arose in 1897 in Bauman v. Ross,79 the leading U . S . Supreme Court
opinion on partial takings. In Bauman, a federal statute that authorized such
a set-off had been invalidated below on the ground, inter alia, that it "at
tempted to pay for [ the parcel taken] partly in future and contingent benefits,
and failed to provide for the just compensation required by the Constitution
to be made. "80 Reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court an
nounced that " [ t ] he Constitution of the

United States contains no express

prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just compensation
to be paid for private property taken for the public use ; and . . . no such
prohibition can be implied."81 The Court carefully emphasized that to qualify
for set-off, the benefits conferred must be "capable of present estimate and
77. Se� text accompanying notes

78.

84-88

f
in ra.

This thought is replicated in R. W. G. Bryant's comment that :
some. arrangeme:it [must be made] whereby public authorities can decide
the use of this or that piece <?f land, from high-rise offices to greenbelt, without
.
having to worry about financial consequences either to the
owner or the public
purse .
supra note 45 at 752. See also Costonis Development Rights Transfer :
nad .xp wa_tdytfssay, &?
L.J. 75, 75-87, 95-103 c l973) ; Hagman' A New Deal :
f
t
Tr ing
in. a � or Wipeouts, 40
9 ( No. 8, 1974) ; ·Wexler Be tterment Re·

·

·

�· �· �· BRYANT,
1

��:;�� 19f (1f973)�

YALE

PLANNING

Proposal for Sounder Land Use Managemen t,

79. 167 U. S. 548 (1897) .
80. Id. at 562.
81. Id. at 584 ( emphasis added) .
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reasonable computation, " 82 since its reason for sustaining .non-dollar compen
sation was that the property owner should be no worse off after condemna
tion than he was before. I n Bauman, the

Court approved the set-off of

"special benefits"-those enjoyed principally b y the condemnee-against the
parcel taken. Twenty-one years later, the Court enlarged the Bauman prin
ciple by holding that "general benefits"-described by the Court as " c ommon
to all property in the vicinity"-may also be set off.83
State courts, in contrast, have generally taken a much harder line on
the set-off issue.84 In some states, benefits cannot be set off at all.85 I n most,

special, but not general, benefits may be set o ff.8 6 Special benefits, moreover,

typically cannot be set off against -land of the condemnee not physically con
tiguous to the parcel taken.87 And in many j urisdictions, they may not be
set off against the compensation payable for the parcel taken-even though
their value clearly exceeds damages to the remainder. 88 Not surprisingly, state
courts have also proclaimed equally strong prohibitions against non-dollar
compensation in other eminent domain contexts-for example, where gov
ernment attempted to compensate in bonds89 o r with substitute land.90
The state court opinions, most of which are of 19th or early 20th Cen
tury vintage, evidence that period's bias toward private rights. They express
the judiciary's unwillingness to permit government to recoup the increase
in land values that it c reates through its public proj ects--despite the obvious
windfalls that accrue thereby to private landowners. They are suffused, more
over, with the fear that non-dollar compensation will prove illusory or will
be exaggerated by condemnation juries anxious to keep awards low. Yet,
benefit assessment programs for such public improvements as streets, sewers,
and the like are universally sustained.91 Surely it is no easier to compute in
creased land values in the benefit assessment context than in the partial taking
context. And contrary to the courts' apprehension about the niggardliness of

82. Id.
83. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354 ( 1918) . No partial taking had
occurred in McCoy, which dealt instead with the issue of whether dollar compensation
was due abutting landowners whose property had all egedly been damaged by . the con
struction of an elevated railway.
84. On the subject of special benefits generally, see 1 0RGEL, supra note 71, ch. l,
§ 7 ; 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 8, § 8.6205 (Sackman ed. 1973 ) ;
Bishop, Enhancement Can Save Tax Dollars, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN LAW 3 1 3 ( Southwestern Legal Foundation ) .
85. See, e.g., Finley v. Board of County Comm'rs, 291 P.2d 333 ( Okla. 1 95 5 ) .
86. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Divit, 2 5 Ill. 2d 93, 182 N.E.2d 749
( 1 962) ; State v. Bailey, 2 1 2 Ore. 261 , 319 P.2d 906 ( 1957).
87. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Fair, 229 Cal. App. 2d 801, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 644 ( 1964) ; Celeste v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 991, 290 N.Y.S.2d 64 ( Ct. Cl. 1968) ,
afj'd, 40 App. Div. 880, 337 N.Y.S.2d 252 ( 1972) .
88. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Home Trust Investment Co., 8 Cal.
App. 3d 1022, 87 Cal. Rptr. 722 ( 1970) ; Department of Public Works v. Morse, 3 Ill.
App. 3d 721, 279 N.E.2d 150 ( 1972 ) .
89. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Henderson, 103 Ariz. 420, 443 P.2d 416 ( 1968).
90. See, e.g., North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equipment Co., 281
N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272 ( 1972 ) .
91. See P. NICHOLS, 1 THE LAW OF EMINE NT DOMAIN § 8.6209 (Sackman ed. 1973 ) .
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condemnation j uries, their disposition unquestionably has been to favor their
fellow citizens with inflated awards, not to mulct them.92

2. Just Compensation and the Highest and Best Use Sta ndard. The
divergent attitudes of the federal and state courts are also re flected in

their

quite different regard for the highest and best use standard as the measure
of just compensation. Defined as the price a willing buyer would pay to

a

willing seller in the private market, that standard invites serious problems
where market forces and public regulation are deeply entwined. Refusing to
make a "fetish . . . of market value,"93 the U . S . Supreme Court has repeat
edly questioned the adequacy of that standard in such instances.94 I n
States

v.

United

Commodities Trading Corp.,95 for example, the question posed

was

whether the j ust compensation requirement precluded the federnl government
from paying a n Office of Price Administration "ceiling price" rather than an
allegedly higher market price for a quantity of pepper requisitioned by the
War Department in

1944. Noting the complexities introduced by public regu

lation, the Court commented :
This Court has never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for
determining what is "j ust compensation" under all circumstances
and in all cases. Fair market value has normally been accepted as a
just standard. But when market value has been too difficult to find,
or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner
or public, courts have fashioned and applied other standards. Since
the market value standard was developed in the context of a market
largely free from governmental controls, prices rigidly fi xed by law
raise questions concerning whether a "market value" so fixed can
be a measure of "just compensation."96
Prior to the Supreme Court' s

1 926 decision of Euclid

v.

Ambler

Realty

Co.,97 state courts rarely encountered similar complexities i n applying the
highest and best use standard when government condemned land. Because
private land values in those days were seldom the subject of deliberate aug
mentation or diminution by public regulation, government wore only one
hat-that of condemnor-and the fiction of analogizing it to a private buyer
paying a market price made tolerable sense. But Euclid bestowed a second
hat on government-that of land value regulator-by expanding governmental
power in two fundamental respects . First i t permitted government,

within

broad constitutional limits, to allocate development potential to private lands
based on community goals as reflected in

public governance measu res ;98

92. See 2 0RGEL, supra note 71 at § 247
93. United
Cors, 337 'u.s. 325: ( 1949) .
. 94. See, e.g.,States
Um.ted States Commo332
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 2 1 ( 1950) ;
Untt9t ��a�eU�S.cIZls, (;g �·� · 325 (1949) ; dities
United States Miller, 317 u.s.1 369
( 1943) .
.
5
96. Id. at 123.
97. 272 U.S . 365.
98. Id. at 389, 390.
v.

v.

v.
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second, it ruled that the resulting dollar value of land so regulated need not
approximate-and indeed may fall drastically below-its value in an unreg
ulated market.99 From that time on, condemned private land has not differed
from the War Department's requisitioned pepper with respect to its valua
tion for eminent domain purposes.
This seeming anomaly has caused the state courts no end of trouble. They
have yet to grasp Euclid's full implications-in large measure because they,
like eminent domain commentators, 1 00 continue to view zoning and other
forms of public governance as alien intrusions into the realm of land value
appraisal. Appreciation of the anomaly's roots could have provided the courts
with a basis for transforming the eminent domain power into a realistic tool
for dealing with overly stringent regulation. Given the Bauman holding and
the recognition in Euclid that within ampl e constitutional limits government
may legitimately regulate private land's development potential and therefore
its " market" value, the courts might have reformulated eminent domain doc
trine in two respects . I n place of the highest and best use standard, they
might have allowed as compensation only that value increment necessary to
cure the taking objection. And they might have broadened acceptable means
of compensation to include, in addition to dollars, marketworthy development
opportunities.
Shortsighted concern for private rights has not only barred this outcome
but has insured that Euclid's erosion of the h ighest and best use standard
would be narrowly interpreted . True, state courts today do give weight to
the impact of public governance on private land value.101 But they have coun
tered with two exceptions that undo much of Euclid's force. First, the valu
ation formula now applied takes as its measure the condemned parcel's "high
est and best use under existin_g or reaso nably probable land use con trols."
As construed, the italicized phrase undercuts public governance as a valua
tion constraint becau s e it requires that the award include both the land's value
under existing land use restrictions and the premium that the market places
on it in anticipation of future zoning changes that will increase its value.1 02

99. According to Professor Ellickson's calculations , the zoning restrictions in Euclid
reduced the value of the plaintiff's property from $870,000 to $540,000 . See A lternatives,
supra note 18, at 700 n.68.
100. It is startling, for example, to find in the index of Orgel's two-volume eminent
domain treatise, 0RGEL, supra note 71, only four references to zoning, two of which refer
to footnotes in the main work and two to textual passages of less than a paragraph's
duration.
1 0 1 . Land use controls, if validly enacted and applied, do afford the basis upon which
a condemned parcel's valuation is calculated-except where the valuation formula allows
for "a reasonable probability of change," as noted in the text. See City of Beverly Hills
v. Anger, 127 Cal. App. 223, 15 P.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1932) ; see generally Zipser, Zomng
Classification and Eminent Domain, 1 URBAN LAWYER 89 90 ( 1969) ; Sackman, The
Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each O ther, 1970 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
IN STITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 107, 124 ( Southwestern Legal
Foundation ) .
102. See Zipser, supra note 101, a t 90 ; Sackman, supra note 101, at 125-26.
,
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That this premium, which is solely the product of public action,103 should be
deemed an increment of the "private" land's value is a throwback to earlie r
times. The exception on which it is founded, moreover, offers a field day for
inventive counsel, for sympathetic condemnation jurors, and for judges who,
in the words of one of their number, see themselves as "Hector [ s ] at the
bridge . . . defend [ ing] the individual from the onslaughts of society. " 104
Further, the exception is not even symmetrically applied : under it, the con
demnee receives a windfall for prospective upzoning, but his award is not
discounted when, instead, downzoning is imminent.105
Second, courts frequently ignore land use controls in determining value
when these controls are imposed prior to condemnation of the fee or of a
lesser interest in the parcel .106 This result is unobj ectionable if the condemn
ing authority intended all along to appropriate the land for its own use and
imposed the restriction merely as a sham to depress the condemnation award.
But this is not the pattern that, I believe, will occur with increasing frequency
in resource protection and related contexts.107 That pattern is likely to in
clude two and, possibly, three elements. First, government severely down
zones land because market pressures, stimulated by the land's presently gen
erous zoning, threaten a resource, such as an urban landmark or an eco
logical preserve . Then, to mitigate the downzoning's economic impact, and
in return for proper assurances safeguarding the resource, government extends

103. For rare judicial acknowledgment of this reality, see City of Miami Beach v.
Hogan, 63 So. 2d 493 ( Fla. ) , cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 ( 1 953 ) , in which the court
rej ecte� a collateral attack on the low density zoning applicable to the condemnee' s parcel,
observmg that, were the attack to succeed, "the city will be compelled to pay the in
creased value brought about by rezoning . . . . " Id. at 495. Cf. United States v. Miller,
3 1 7 U.S. 369 ( 1 943 ) (refusing to include in a condemnation award value increments re
sulting from the public improvement necessitating the condemnation on the ground that
" [t ] he owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the
Government's activities." Id. at 377 ) .
More representative of judicial attitudes i s Levin v . State of New York, 17 App. Div.
2d 335, �34 N._Y.S.2d 481 ( 1 962) , af]'d, 13 N .Y.2d 87, 192 N.E.2d 155, 242 N.Y.S.2d 193
( 19�3 ) , m which the condemnee on October 6, 1954, purchased a parcel zoned for resi
dential use for $3,500 per a�re ; succeeded in having it upzoned to light industrial use
on Octa.her 26, 1 954 ; too� tltl_e on December I , 1 95 4, entering into a net lease with an
electronics fir'!l under which 1t :vas to construct a facility for the latter ; and suffered
the cc;mdemnation of . 21 acres of its parcel on December 31, 1954. Sustaining an eminent
doma111 award t�at mcreased
t?e value of the acreage condemned by some $18,000 per
acre for a total mcremen�al gam of $378,000, the court commented :
!�� fact that cla11?1ants stood to make a handsome profit from their favorable
acqu.mtion of the subj ect property and subsequent favorable lease to [the elec
tronics firm ) shout? not deprive claimants of the rewards of a successful busi
ness. enterprise, which was lost because of the appropriation
f,d. .at 3�7, �34 N.X. S.2d at �83. Levin's
moral is clear : gove�nment must pay for the
private gams that its regulation fosters.
104. Young, The Role of the fudge in a Condemnation Proceeding in REAL ESTATE
V������Ns:�
�o��Ml����9 �83, 695-96 ( PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course
H
ie
6 )
105. See, e.g., Remdol lar v. Kaiser, 195 Md. 314, 73 A.2d 493 ( 1950)
106. See, e.g., Robertson v. City of Salem 191 F.
604 (D 0 r 1961 ) . Galt
v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 ( 1950 ) . See Supp
gene�ally Zip�er �pra note 101
'
at 93 ; Sackman, supra note 101, at 124.
107. See text accompanying notes 168-210 , 216-22 infra.
·

'
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to the landowner a compensatory supplement which-though worth less than
the drop in the land's value as a result of downzoning-does afford him a
reasonable return when considered in conjunction with the return he enjoys
from the land's present use. Finally, instead of dollars, the supplement might
be in kind, including, for example, a governmentally protected, limited-use
monopoly108 or, perhaps, an authorization to transfer the regulated land's
development rights to non-sensitive locations elsewhere.109
This approach could backfire in light of eminent domain's doctrinal bars
against non-dollar compensation and prior downzoning. Indeed, the conscien
tiouS' regulatory authority virtually invites this Catch-22 result because, in
extending the compensatory supplement, it effectively acknowledges the im
plausibility of the police power as the sole basis for its program. Mesmerized
by the correlatives model, the courts might well force the authority to the
eminent domain extreme,110 with its requirement of dollar compensation fig
ured on the parcel's highest and best use under the prior generous zoning
plus such additional zoning increments as are deemed "reasonably probable."
Is it any wonder that public officials-alarmed by this vicious legal version
of Russian Roulette--have little incentive to try to meet injured landowners
half-way, but choose instead either not to regulate at all or to camouflage the
measure in police power trappings and take their chances in court ?

C.

The No-Win Outcome of the Police Power/Eminent Domain Deadlock
Were the Man from Mars to swoop over the cratered battlefield of land

use, what he might need most to appreciate the struggle is not legal acuity,
but a strong sense of irony. For it is a struggle in which victories are pyrrhic
and losers count themselves winners. It swirls in a void where . public gov
ernance systems, because they pay little heed to their private impacts, win
a battle or two, and then are undone. In their plight, these regulatory systems
resemble the description Buckminster Fuller once gave of the world : an oc

topus constantly stepping on itself.11 1 The void in which they swirl is perhaps
American land use law's most characteristic feature ; it is certainly its most self
defeating one.

1.

The Real Estate Community and the Environmentalists. The real

estate community, heartened by the pervasive bias of eminent domain doc
trine for private rights, ritualistically proclaims that formal eminent · domain
proceedings alone are an acceptable curative for stringent land use controls.

108. See text accompanying notes 155-67 infra.
109. See text accompanying notes 168-72 infra.
110. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d
762 ( Sup. Ct. 1973 ) , afj'd 47 App. Div. 2d 715 ( 1 975 ) , discussed in text accompanying
notes 195-210 infra; cf. Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 ( 1901 ) ,
discussed in text accompanying notes 233-50 infra ; Bissel v. Town of Bethel, 1 13 Conn.
323, 155 A. 232 ( 193 1 ) .
1 1 1 . As quoted by Jonathan Barnett in an Address on Law, Development and His
toric Preservation, given at the Columbia ( N.Y. ) International Center, Apr. 23, 1975.
·
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generally
al land use p ractice
The interests of that community and of ration
_
_
unfaJT
their drum fi.re against
would be better served if its member s continued
their suppo rt to a search
uses of the police power but, at the same time, lent
_
so, th ey would disco- er tl at
for intermediate compensatory formats . I n doing
pers often confl ct with
they are not a monolithic bloc. The interests of develo
are transl ated mto the
those of landowners. Windfalls accruing to the latter
land, driving up their
often exorbitant prices that developers must pay for
t o their customers.
enterprise and financing costs and, ultimately, the price
this i ndefensible out
Some heavy intramural jostling is long overdue about
·

:
�

�

come.112
Imbalance also flaws the rhetoric of supporters of strong resource pro
tection programs. Mistakenly, in my j u dgment, they view as an unmixed
blessing the sweeping expansion of the police power recorded in occasional
judicial decisions.113 But the lasting impact of these decisions is threatened
by the fierce political backlash they actuate among such formidable private
groups as the real estate community.114 This reaction, it must be und erlined,
1s not wholly devoid of ethical or policy merit.1H> Moreover, it is one thing

1 12. Some movement in this direction has already occurred. Over 1 5 years ago,
HousE AND HoME, the trade organ of the house builders industry, strongly endorsed
windfall recoupment by government, recognizing that it would lower the price that devel
opers must pay for land, thereby lowering the price of housing for the ultimate customer.
See 18 HousE AND HoME, Aug. 1960 passim. Unfortunately, the industry has not since
systematically urged this hopeful · initiative.
11 3. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 ( 1 st Cir.
1972) ; Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 1 1
Cal. App. 3 d 557, 8 9 Cal. Rptr. 897 ( 1970 ) ; Just v . Marinette County, 5 6 Wis. 2d 7 , 201
N.W.2d 761 ( 1972 ) .
1 �4. _The opposition o f real estate and financial interests, for example, has been in
fluential m blocking Congressional e fforts since 1 972 to adopt national land use legislation.
For an account of the demise of the most recent ( 1 975) national land use bill ' see N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1975, at 15, col. 4.
. 1 1 5. For instance, Steel �ill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 ( 1 st
Cir. 1972 ) , a ce!ebrate? favorite of the police power enthusiasts, is something less than
a paragon of fair Pll:b�1c governance, as revealed by Professor Delogu's scathing attack
.
on the follow-up dec1s10n to Steel Hill, abstracted in 27 LAND USE AND ZONING DIGEST
1 ( No. l , 1974) (barring on res j udicata grounds the same developer's challenge to the
town's land use regime ) . See Delogu, Steel Hill Development Incorporated v. Town of
Sanbornton, 27 L�N_D ?SE & Z o� I NG DIGEST 6-_7 ( No. 3, 1 975 ) . Among the abuses shel
tered �y that dec1s1on s percept10n of the pohce power, Professor Delogu details the
following :
.
_A side from the injustice to plaintiff, who has now been rebuffed three times
m. his effort to develop land which he owns
in the town of Sanbornton the real
.
m�sch1ef of the pr:esent holding is its capacity to encourage continued
�nd wider
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�
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.
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to score occasional dramatic victories in the courts ; it is another to implement
resource protection programs that are sufficiently responsive to the legitimate
concerns of all affected groups to serve as a durable foundation for successful
public governance. Enough has been said earlier116 to raise grave doubts as
to whether the police power, unaided by reasonable compensatory alternatives,
can provide this foundation.
2.

The Courts. Sympathy coupled with a sense of irony is appropriate

in assessing the performance of the courts, upon which the brunt of the public
governance/private rights struggle has improperly fallen. They now suffer
from an advanced case of doctrinal schizophrenia. When presiding over emi
nent domain proceedings, they brim with confidence, comfortable in their role
as guardians of constitutional rights and as interpreters ( if not authors) of
the rules that govern these rights. But when they are called upon to adj udicate
the constitutionality of stringent land use measures, confidence evaporates and
erratic opinions lacking in cogent or consistent reasoning abound. St. George
was an odds-on favorite in his battle compared to the courts, with few re
sources of their own to handle the economic-appraisal issues that complicate
these legal challenges, with scant guidance from the legislatures, and without
a secure societal consensus about which economic expectancies are the land
owner's and which the government's.
Doctrinal schizophrenia shows up in the courts' willingness to permit
eminent domain doctrines to ossify in order to protect private rights, while
simultaneously widening the police power to effectuate the public interest in
resource protection. Logically, one would have assumed that economic expec
tancies in land merit the same degree of protection whether threatened by
government's exercise of its eminent domain or of its police power. In fact,
the courts have employed a double standard. Exemplifying their desire to
have it both ways are two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions. The
first, Just v. Marinette County,117 sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power a "Shorelands Conservancy District" designation that essentially pre
cluded Mr. Just from improving his lakeside site, even for personal use. No
amateur in doctrinal sleight-of-hand, the court rested its result on the orac
ular pronouncement that "it is not an unreasonable exercise of [the police]
power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property
to its natural uses."118 Yet two years before, in Luber v. Milwaukee County,119
the same court invalidated a Wisconsin eminent domain statute that denied
extended indefinitely by procedural devices which foreclose reexamination of
initial, tentative, or inconclusive findings.
Id. at 7.
For a different view of another favorite of the enthusiasts, Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 ( 1972 ) , see text accompanying notes 1 1 7-120 infra.
1 16. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
1 17. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 ( 1972 ) .
1 18. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
1 19. 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N. W.2d 380 ( 1970 ) .
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compensation for rental losses suffered by the condemnee a year or more

before

the taking. Overruling its own precedents and departing from the

�reat

majority of its sister state courts, the Wisconsin court further enlarged p nvate

rights in the context of eminent domain by declaring as a c o nstitutional ne
cessity that compensation awards must include an increment both for conse
quential damages, such as the rental losses in Luber, and for the condemned
property's fair market value.12 0 With lust and Luber in the books, one can
not help but wonder how the Wisconsin court would define the compensation
a public agency would have to pay if it condemned an ecologically sensitive
site which was also ideally situated for development as a regional shopping
center.
What is especially ironic about the contradictory evolution of eminent
domain and police power doctrine is that ju dicial excesses in one make in
evitable off-sett ing distortions in the other. A s noted earlier, the courts appre
ciate that financially pressed government cannot found public governance on
the eminent domain power, and they are properly solicitous of the need for
strong controls i n resource protection and similar context s . Having painted
themselves-and government planning authorities-into a corner by sponsor
ing harsh eminent domain rules, they have little choice but to sanction the
police power's lopsided expansion when resource protection schemes are chal
lenged as takings.

The L egislatures. Properly skeptical of the courts' ability alone to

3.

master the compensation problem, 9ther commentators121 have rightly coun
seled a more active role for the legislatures. But the legislatures have not been
li stening. They have done little to revise eminent domain doctrines to meet
modern needs. They have enacted ambitious regulatory programs that either
ignore the programs' economic impacts122 or, equally futilely, ordain recourse
to formal eminent domain proceedings to save the programs if they are deemed
confi scatory on j udicial examination.123 With a few striking exceptions noted
below,1 24 they have not devised intermediate compensatory formats. Most dis
tressingly, they do not appreciate that theirs is the institution best fitted to
address the compensation problem in a balanced and thorough manner. How
ever unwisely, the National Association of Homebuilders can be expected to
push 1 9th Century nostrums and the Conservation Foundation broad police
power solutions ; one does not denigrate either group i n observing that they
are, after all , special pleaders for particular i nterests. The courts have prob-

1 20. ld. at 283. 177 N . W.2d at 386.
1 ; 1 . Sec, l' ..<J. , Michelman, supra_ note 1 7, at 1248-5 7 ; Sax, supra note 6, at 175.
L2. Sa, 1' .'J . , LA. REv. STAT. tit 56, ch. 8, § § 1 84 1 c t seq. ( 1975
)
IowA CODE ANN
1 08a. §§ l08A. l r t seq. ( 1 975 ) .
Sl'i', r.y. , M A S S . GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 ( 1 972 ) ; N .H. REv. STAT. §
483-A
•

ch.

·

·
'

097���·

1 24. S,·.- text accompanying notes 145-53 infra ( "Ramapo Plan" )
, t ext accompanying notes 1 9 :>- 2 1 0 rnf ra ( Tudor Parks transferable development
'

·

. -

·

·

rights program ) .

1975]

ACCOMMODA TION POWER

1049

ably done about as well as could be expected, but they obviously cannot handle
the task by themselves. In the last analysis, it is the job of legislatures to
hear the claims of competing groups and to accommodate their legitimate
interests as fully as possible within a normative framework understandable
both to these groups and to reviewing courts. Ultimately, it is their job to
take the leading role in forging a value consensus concerning the entitlements
of land ownership in 20th Century America. Their failure to get on with the
job is the root cause of the nation's taking quandary.
III.

THE AccoMMODATION POWER

Express recognition of the accommodation power could prove a potent
aid in untangling the compensation conundrum. The power would j oin with,
but not displace, the police and eminent domain powers as a regulatory tool.
Hence, accommodation would be unnecessary where government's pursuit of
health, safety and general welfare goals does not unfairly impinge on prop
erty owners. Nor is it appropriate when government acquires private land
outright.125 But accommodation ought to be government's responsibility in the
borderline cases, exemplified by the facts in Just, where fair compensation
for burdened landowners would seem an ethical imperative.
How might legislatures define the borderline case when considering the
adoption of strict regulatory programs, and how might courts define it when
called upon to review private challenges to them ? The lesson of a half-century
of judicial wrestling with this problem is that it admits to no simple answer.
Prior experience does teach, however, that it has both a substanti.ve dimension
-at what point do regulatory incursions on private land's development poten
tial "go too far" to be sustained under the police power ?-and an institutional
dimension-what are the respective roles of legislatures, courts and admin
istrative bodies in fixing� that point and in assuring fair compensation when
it is exceeded ? Implicit in past experience also is embryonic j udicial and
legislative recognition of the accommodation power. Each of these topics is
addressed in the paragraphs that follow.
A.

The Spectrum of Land Use Intensity : A Framework for A nalysis
One way to define the accommodation power's scope is to establish a

framework that fixes the varying levels of a private parcel's development po125. While the eminent domain rules alluded to in text ought, in my judgment, to be
reformulated to reflect a sounder balance between private property rights and public
governance interests, more secure protection than the accommodation power a ffords is
warranted when government directly expropriates private land. It should, perhaps, also
be stressed that it is not the purpose of this article to assail all eminent domain rules as
biased toward private rights, but only those rules singled out in text. As Professor Michel
man convincingly argues, other eminent domain rules, such as those barring compensa
tion for relocation expenses, unduly favor the government as condemnor, and warrant
liberalization through legislative action. See Michelman, supra note 17, passim.
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tential in terms of familiar land use and eminent domain categories. Recasting
the facts in Just, for example, a spectrum of these intensities for a parcel
within the Shorelands Conservancy District might appear as follows :
�
-<

SPECTRUM OF LAND USE INTEN SITY

.......

E-<
z

�
E-<
0
ii.
E-<

z
�
:21

ii.
0
�
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INTENSITY INDEX
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Highest and Best Use Unrestricted by Public Regulation

Hotel

$4,000,000

Allowable Use

Single Family Housing, 10
Dwelling Units/ Acre

$1,000,000

Reasonabl e Beneficial Use

Single Family Housing, 2
Dwelling Units/Acre

$ 200,000

Resource Protection Use

Shorelands Conservancy
( Acquacultural Uses Only )

-$

75,000

Zero Intensity Use

None

-$

50,000

(!)
z
.......
CJ)

-<
�
�
u
z
.......

The first and last categories, Highest and Best Use Unrestricted by
Public Regulation and Zero Intensity Use, need little explanation. The former,
reminiscent of the pre.:.Euclid highest and best use standard, i s simply the use
promising the greatest dollar return from an unregulated parcel. The latter
allows no use at all and is represented above as having a negative return
because the owner must nevertheless pay real estate tax and other carrying
costs that are incident to land ownersh ip. No one today, except perhaps the
private marketeers, seriously urges that landowners enjoy a legal entitlement
to the first category. And, excluding some difficult-to-conceive situations in
which all possible uses of a private parcel would result in proscribable harms,
only the most rabid of police power enthusiasts would insist that governme nt
is free to deprive a property owner of t h e entire development potential of his
land without affording him some compensatory relief.
The Resource Protection Use category is exemplified by the Shorelands
Conservancy designation in Just-that is, tight land use controls, typically
adopted to protect natural and man-made environmental amenities. But two
qualifications are necessary here. First, this category i s plotted below the
R easonable Beneficial Use category on the . foregoing chart only for illustra
tive purposes ; in some ci rcumstances, resource p rotection control could permit
a greater economic return than that possible under Reasonable Beneficial Use
controls. A negative value is assigned to the Resource Protection Use cate
gory on the chart to reflect not only the p rivate land's carrying costs but
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also possible additional costs that might have to be absorbed to adapt the
land for the uses permitted under the Conservancy designation.126 Second,
this category may apply to measures serving such ends as growth manage
ment, nonconforming use amortization or airport zoning, which are environ
mental only in the broadest sense.
The Allowable Use category denotes a level of development potential that
is substantially more liberal than necessary to prevail against a confiscation
challenge. It is, in fact, the category under which the vast majority of private
land is zoned in America today. Accordingly, it usually corresponds to what,
in eminent domain terminology, is the standard of "highest and best use under
existing land use controls." If, in addition, the condemnee succeed s in dem
onstrating that liberalization of land use controls affecting his parcel is " rea
sonably probable," the further increment of development potential will fall
somewhere between the Allowable Use a n d the Highest and Best Use Un
restricted by Public Regulation categories.
Though last discussed, the Reasonable Beneficial Use category127 ranks
first in importance because it defines the borderline between measures that
are sustainable under the police power a n d those which must be predicated
on the accommodation power. As such, this category refers to an intensity
of development potential which affords a sufficient economic return on pri
vate land to escape invalidation on confiscation grounds. It is premised on
the only generalization that can be confidently extrapolated from the welter
of confiscation precedent s : namely, that land use controls can bar a parcel's
most profitable use or even uses of lesser profitability without being confis
catory if they allow the landowner a reasonable economic return or, under

the label used here, a Reasonable Beneficial Use. 1 28

Land use controls may be enacted under the police power if they permit
an intensity of use that equals or is greater than that prescribed b y the Rea126. The "negative value" concept has been expressly recognized by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, author of the Just opinion, which, in Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60
Wis. 2d 640, 2 1 1 N.W.2d 471 ( 1 973 ) , invalidated as confiscatory the designation of a
landowner's parcel as Agricultural on the ground, inter alia, that the parcel would have
a "negative value" if the landowner were forced to absorb the costs of adapting it for
agricultural uses. See id. at 652, 21 1 N.W.2d at 477.
127. Readers familiar with English planning and compensation law will note the
similarity between the Reasonable Beneficial Use category used in text and the criterion
of capability of "reasonably beneficial use" found in England's Town and Country Plan
ning Act of 1971, ch. 78, § 180. For a discussion of that criterion's function in English
planning and com pensation practice, see TAKING, supra note 5, at 268- 75.
128. With few, if any, exceptions, none of the numerous cases labeled as "new mood"
opinions in THE TAKING IssuE support the proposition that "a regulation of the use of
land, if reasonably related to a valid public purpose, can never constitute a taking."
TAKING, supra note 5, at 238. What they do support is the generalization that the eco
nomic return possible under public governance may deviate substantially from that pos
sible in an unregulated market, provided that the former return does not fall below a
Reasonable Beneficial Use standard. Even Just, which illustrates the outer range of the
new mood opinions, does not reject that standard as the determinant of confiscation, but
instead offers a novel interpretation of it-namely, that it may be calculated on the basis
of an ecologically sensitive parcel's natural rather than improved uses.
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sonable Beneficial Use level. If the permitted intensity is less than this, gov
ernment must then employ the accommo dation power. Accordingly, as the
chart above is structured, the accommodation power-rather than the police
power-would b e the proper tool in the Resource Protection category because
the economic return possible under it falls below that plotted for the parcel's
Reasonable Beneficial Use. When such discrepancies occur, government would
have two options. If it lacks the wherewithal to provide fair compensation,
it must liberalize the challenged restriction. But, in doing so, it need allocate
only enough additional density to satisfy the Reasonabl e Beneficial Use Stan
dard. If it possesses the resources and wishes to save the defective measure,
it must provide fair compensation.
Fair compensation under the accommodation power

differs from the

eminent domain power's just compensation in three basic respects. First, its
measure i s the difference between the parcel's economic return under the
challenged restriction and under the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard ; for
j ust compensation, the relevant measure would be the difference between the
return under the regulation and the return possible under the Allowable Use
category or-through manipulation of the "reasonable probability" exception
-under an even higher level. Second, fair compensation may take the form
of any marketworthy alternative, whether or not monetary ; ju st compensa
tion, on the other hand, would probably have to be in dol lar s . Finally, pro
cedures for the award of fair compensation can be streamlined by eliminating
such features as the condemnation j ur y and the bifurcated system, currently
exi sting, 129 that requires an initial declaratory action to determine whether a
regulatory measure is a "taking" and then a formal eminent domain proceed
ing to fix the requisite compensation. 1 3 0
So far, nothing has been said about how the Reasonable Beneficial Use
standard is to b e fixed in specific instances. What i s a constitutional rate of
return, for example, on an urban landmark building in a booming or depressed
construction market or on prime agricultural land or an ecologically sensitive
site in the path of or remote from imminent urbanization ? The omission is
deliberate. This article's goal is to clarify the currently misconceived treatment
of the "taking issue" so-called, not to prescribe concrete rules for determin
ing when, in specific cases, regulation deprives a landowner of a Reasonable
B eneficial Use return.
129. For examples of statutes expressly incorporating this bifurcation see note 1 23
'

supra.

13� . . The distinctions between "fair" and "just" compensation demonstrate that statutes
author1Z1�1g local governments to zo'?e through the eminent domain power, see text ac
co.mpanymg note 56 supra, are pure instances of eminent domain,
not, as Kansas City v.
mdl.e, 446 S.V\:'.2d 807, 813. (Mo. 1969) st<l:tes, a "blending of the
two powers (em inent
omam and police power ) m the sa�e legislati ve enactment."
The compensation man
dated �Y these statutes must accord with _the procedur al and
substantive requirements of
.
the emment .domam power rat�er than _w ith those identified in
text as pertaining to the
�cco�m�atlon �ower. <;:on us1?n on t 1s I?oint is simply another illustration of the mis,
,
1dent1ficahon of regulation wi th the police power." See text
accompanymg no tes 52-67

f

�

supra.

�

·
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It is my belief that, up to now, we have behaved regarding the taking
question very much like Lewi s Carroll's dreamy Alice who, when faced with
the question whether cats eat bats or, for that matter, whether bats eat cats,
mistakenly concluded that "as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't
much matter which way she put it." More important than seeking to "answer"
the taking question at this stage is determining whether the right question
is being asked. Because, in my judgment, we have been asking the wrong
question, we still have little idea what a constitutional rate of return should
be in the cases posed above. Devising fair responses will be the work of
legislatures, courts and, to an increasing degree, administrative agencies which
must begin by getting the question right ; and they must be prepared to revise
whatever responses seem appropriate for one period in light of shifting com
munity values later.
Poaching somewhat on their territory, I would venture five preliminary.
suggestions. First, the tasks are principally legislative or administrative, with
the courts playing an essentially supporting role. Their job will be t o decide
whether legislative standards or their application in specific cases comport
with what Justice Douglas has called "the political ethics reflected in the
Fifth Amendment. " 13 1 Contrary to the fear that this approach will encroach
on the proper role of the courts, it is my guess that the judiciary will welcome
being freed from the frustrating task of setting fair rates of return with little
or no help from these other institutions.
Second, legislative standards should . be contextually derived.

Precise

quantitative formulae may be fitting in some cases132-as the analogies in the
rent control and public utility rate-setting fields suggest-while broader qual
itative standards, which perhaps merely codify the criteria that recur in land
use decisions, 133 may be the best or most appropriate standards that can be
offered in others.
Third, despite the apparent quantitative cast of the Spectrum of Land
Use Intensity, I envisage a determination of Reasonable Beneficial Use rates
that will be heavily interlaced with value judgments rooted in community
standards.134 These determinations, in other words, will rest as much on cul
tural as on narrower appraisal or technical grounds.
131. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 ( 1 949 ) .
132. The New York City landmarks ordinance exemplifies a precise quantitative
standard measuring the Reasonable Beneficial Use level. That ordinance authorizes out
right denial of a permit for alteration or demolition of landmark buildings which yield
a "reasonable return"--<lefined as a six per cent return on the assessed valuation of the
property. See N .Y.C. Admin. Code Ann. ch. 8-A, §§ 207- 1.0, 207-8.0 ( Cum. Supp. 1 9741975 ) . The constitutionality of this provision has not yet been tested.
133. For a similar suggestion, see Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of In.verse
Condemnation Criteria : The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727, 737-8
( 1 967) . This approach is ill ustrated in a resource protection plan developed by the writer
and Robert De Voy for use in Puerto Rico. See PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note 13,
at 14- 16.
134. For all tl-\e uneasiness that it may cause in some quarters, the significance of the
cultural element as a determinant of the legal entitlements associated with land ownership
cannot be overemphasized. See generally R. W. G. BRYANT, LAND : PRIVATE PROPERTY
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35
power shou ld increase only modestly1
Fourth, use of the accommodation
ion is required as a complement to regula
the instances in which compensat
n to displace the police power or to freeze
tion. It is not that powe r's missio
y to prevent it from serving as a cloak
its evolution for all time, but merel
less exacting procedural and com
for governmental overreaching. With its
should lessen government's un
pensatory features, the accommodation power
power where a compensatory
derstandable temptation to employ the police
ed economically unfeasible by
approach is compelled by fairness, but is render
the requirements of eminent domain .

overcoming equal
Finally, the accommodation power may prove useful in
ion problems. De
protection objections that are often presente d as confiscat

, not be
spite their use of taking language, courts invalidate many measures
Reasonable
cause they drive the economic return of affected parcels below the

Beneficial Use standard, but becau se they do not grant to some landowners
the economic benefits that they afford to others who are similarly situated.
Richard Babcock' s example136 of the upzoning of one quadrant of a highway
intersection for commercial uses comes to mind, as does the selective zoning
of land into alternate bands of high and low density development to achieve
phased development137 o r an orderly distribution of kinds of uses. Confiscation
is not the objection of the disappointed owners of land in the other three
quadrants or within the areas designated for low density development, rePUBLIC CONTROL ( 1 972 ) . It is fruitless to attempt to answer in a cultural vacuum the
question-Which economic expectancies in "private" land are the state's and which the
landowner's ? This question could be confidently resolved in a manner favoring private
rights in the United States through at least the early part of this century because of a
larger societal consensus that viewed land as an object of private commercial exploita
tion. While this consensus is now breaking down, it has by no means disappeared entirely.
Because the expectation of some degree of economic return remains vital in the func
tioning of the American economic system and in American attitudes towards land gener
ally, in my judgment it is as improper as it is futile to urge as a replacement for that
consensus a view that wholly disdains private economic expectations. Hence, my dis
agre�ment with THE TAKING IssuE's j urisprudence or, if you will, anthropology . It is
possible that the_ f1;1t_ure may bring a shift in prevailing community standards as they
bea.r both . on pr_1ont1es for regulatory goals and on the fairness of allowing the losses
which . their ac�1evement under the police power portends to fall disproportion ately on
some m the pnvate sector. Perhaps the nation will move to a situation akin to that in
�ngland where, accor�ing to R. W. G. B ryant, "purely speculative profit-making in land
is
regarded as be_mg not quite respectable," id. at 325, and owners of land in green
belt areas who are virtually barred . from de_veloping at all "must simply accept this as
.
?ne of. the facts of hfe, whatever their financial loss." Id. at 127. If it does, a correspond
ing �hift of the R�asonable Beneficial Use standard on the Spectrum of Land Use In
tens1� would �e . 1� order. �here is no logical confl ict, in short, between holding an
ess�ntt�lly relattv1stic concepti_on of property rights, such as that presented
by Professor
�h1lbn�k, see �ext accompanying note 16 siiprf!-, and insisting that, in a
given society at a
g.1ven ttm�, this concept10n nonetheless ;equtres recognition of a
residuum of private
.
nghts whtc� the . sta�e may not mvade without compensation .
135. This pomt is further developed at text accompanying notes
224-28 infra.
36.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 1 69-70 ( 1 %6 ) . In the
hypothetical portrayed
.
m
HE 1
GAME, Richard B?bcock suggests that a true
confiscation obj ection
.
migh t a so ie ��ause the low �en�tty of the non-upzoned
land in the three quadrants
a
ount to permanent dedication of . . . open space withou
t compen sation." Id.
6
137. See Fairfax County v. Allman, 2 1 1 S.E.2d 48 ( 1975
).
·

·

.

. ,f
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spectively, as long as the zoning applicable to these owners meets the Rea
sonable Beneficial Use test. Rather, it is that government has bestowed eco
nomic benefits on

some landowners whose physical situation may differ

imperceptibly from that of the unlucky plaintiffs.188

The possible unfairness to these disappointed landowners can be reme
died in one of three way s : by compensating them ;139 by requiring the favored
landowners to pay for the upzoning ;140 or by combining these alternatives,
and using the payments of the favored owners to compensate the disfavored.14 1
Whichever route is taken, the accommodation power should prove helpful in
fixing both the medium and the extent of compensation-or recoupment-that
are appropriate in specific instances. Although it is impossible t o do more
here than broach this suggestion, it could well occur that, in the long run,
the accommodation power's contribution to the resolution of this problem will
give a greater boost to rational land management than its aid i n solving the
confiscation dilemma.
B.

The Accommodation Power: Implicit Judicial and Legislative Recognition
Judicial and legislative recognition of the accommodation power is na

scent at best. Both institutions are backing into recognition rather than arriv
ing at it through deliberate reflection and articulate choice. Emergent aware
ness, moreover, is encrusted with traditional conceptions, many of which deny
the very tendencies that the power seeks to nurture. Despite or even because
of these uncertainties and masked conflicts, examples of the tensions attending
the power's emergence may aid in its further delineation. Selected for con
sideration from the j udicial side is the well-known N ew York Court of Appeals
decision, Golden v. Planning Board (Ramap o ) , 1 4 2 which approved the Town
of Ramapo's controversial growth management plan. Although Ramapo is
celebrated-or reviled-for its treatment of exclusionary zoning, our concern
will be with Ramapo 's other dimension-its holding that a regulatory mea
sure that barred the subdivision of private land for up to 18 years was not
a "taking." Culled from the legislative side is a resource protection technique
called transferable development rights ( TDR ) , which has attracted widespread
attention . TDR compensates owners for restrictions on the development of
138. Id. The A llman court conceded that the plaintiff's parcel could have been devel
oped "withO'Jt loss" under the existing zoning, but observed that the parcel would in
crease in value by almost $2.5 million if upzoned to a density equivalent to that which the
county had permitted for proximate parcels. Id. The court's basic concern, however, was
that the selective upzoning of these latter parcels was unfair to property owners, such as
the plaintiff, whose land was retained in its low density classification, in order to achieve
the county's planning obj ective of phased develo p ment. Id. at 52-55.
139. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 1 70 ( 1 966) .
140. See M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 184-86
( 1971 ) .
141. See generally Hagman , A New Deal: Windfalls for Wipeoitts, 40 PLANNING 9
(No. 8, 1974) ; cf. text accompanying notes 168-72 infra.
142. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y. S.2d 138 ( 1972 ) .
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their land, not with dollars, but with the entitlement to transfer their unused
development rights to parcels elsewhere.143 Examined first is the question of
whether TDR should be predicated on the police or the accommodation power ;
and, second is a 1974 New York trial court decision, Fred F. French Invest

ing Company

v.

City of New York ( Tudor Parks) ,144 which, in striking down

a TDR program, illustrates the pitfalls that await programs based on the
accommodation power if they are assessed using ill-fitting police or eminent
domain power standards.

1.

The Courts: Ramapo' s "O ther Di,mension." Ramapo is properly re

garded as heralding the unprecedented power of local governments to manage
community growth. But Ramapo's treatment of the taking problem, largely
ignored in commentary, is no less dramatic. One searches the reports in vain
for prior judicial sanction of regulatory measures which restrain the devel
opment of private land for nearly a generation. What are found are opinions
that grouse over development moratoria of a few years or less, 145 or- that go
so far as to declare that official map reservations of school or park lands for

only one year are literal takings. 14 6

The Ramapo court was not unaware that it was sanctioning extraordinary
restraints. Though di ssenting from the maj ority view on the plan's exclu
s ionary aspects, Judge Breitel intimated his concurrence that the plan was
not confiscatory.147 Observing that the taking problem is not "insuperable," he
set forth the text for which this article is exegesis by commenting that " [ t J here
is little doubt that the compulsion of current interests and conflicts will re
quire a re-examination of much legal and j u dicial thinking in this area. "148
Despite the absence of explicit recognition of the accommodation power, both
the majority and, derivatively, the dissenting opinions effectively validated
it in sustaining the 18-year restrict ion. What saved the plan from being con
fiscatory was, in their view, its deliberate inclu sion of factors that mitigated
its otherwise draconian impact and thereby satisfied fundamental considerations
of fairness. Among the factors which elevated the economic return on affected
lands from what was surely a negative value to what the majority149 found
to be a Reasonable B eneficial Use return were : a residual right to construct
a single family residence on plattable land ; an interim reduction in real estate
taxes keyed to the depreciation caused by the restrictions ; an option afforded
to the landowner to accelerate the construction date by providing the requisite
143. See authorities cited in note 168 infra.
144. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.Zd 762 ( Sup. Ct. 1 973) aff'd mem 47 App . Div 2d
7 1 5, 366 N . Y. S.Zd 346, m o tion for lem:e to appeal granted, 47 App
. Di·�. 2d 815 ( 1 975)
145. Sc � , e.g., Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. Hackensack Meadowlands
Dev. Comm n, 1 1 9 N.J. Super 5 72, 293 A.2d 192, pe tition for cert.
denied, 62 N.J. 72,
299 A.2d 69 ( 1 972) ; Mang v. County of Santa Barbara 182 Cal App
2d 93 5 Cal Rptr.
724 ( 1 960 ) ; Annot., 30 A. L.R.3d 1 1 96 ( 1 970 ) .
·
146. Lomarch Corp. v. City of Englewood, S I N.J. 108, 237
A 2d 881 ( 1 968)
147. 30 N.Y.Zd 359, 387-90, 285 N.E.Zd 291 , 307-09, 334 N.Y. S.2d
1 38 ' I 60-6Z ( 1972 ) .
Id.
148.
a t 390, 285 N.E.2d at 309, 334 N.Y. S.2d at 162
149. Id. at 381 -83, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.
S.2d �t 1 54-56.
.

'

·
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public facilities ; the right to proceed with development in accordance with
the town's capital improvements timetable, whether or not the town met that
timetable ; the present vesting and assignability of the future right t o develop·;
the benefit of substantial incremental values that would accrue in time to the
restricted land as a consequence of the phased installation of public facilities
pursuant to a carefully elaborated comprehensive plan ; and the "temporary"
nature of the restrictions, which were imposed, not to enhance the town's
resource position, but to coordinate private advantage with public facilities
and needs.
It is not my purpose to argue that the court was correct in its conclusion
that these features i n fact afforded the plaintiffs a Reasonable Beneficial Use
return. Indeed, one of the curiosities of the plaintiffs' presentation was their
apparent failure to marshal precise economic data on this crucial issue.150 Nor
do I believe that these features exemplify the accommodation power in as
pristine a form as does, for example, the TDR program employed to protect
the Tudor Parks .151 Certainly, neither the Ramapo public officials nor the
Court of Appeals e xplicitly conceived of the plan as a showcase for that
power, since the accommodation power nomenclature is original to this article.
But my analysis is intended to demonstrate that the court's preoccupation
with these features evidences its appreciation that the 18-year restriction could
not be justified solely on conventional police power grounds. That power's
hallmark, after all,

is

regulation to protect

noncompensatory

community

health, safety and welfare, and not the compensation of land owners burdened
by needful public regulation. Professor Freund emphasized this point in his
now-classic distinction between the police and em inent domain powers :
[ I ] t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because
it is harmful. . . . From this results the difference between the power
of eminent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes
a right to compen sation, while the latter on principle does not.1112

150. Id. at 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N Y. S .2d at 154.
151. See text accompanying notes 195-210 infra.
152. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 ( 1 904) .
.

This position recurs in land use precedents both old and new. For example, one of
the objections raised by the landowner in Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S.
394 ( 1915 ), against a zoning ordinance barring the use of his land for brickmaking pur
poses was that, in prohibiting his business altogether, the ordinance was unduly harsh.
Rejecting this contention, the court declared that " . . . we ca1U1ot declare invalid the
exertion of a power [the police power] which the city undoubtedly has because of a
charge that it does not exactly accommodate the conditions [that it sought to achieve]
or that some other exercise would have been better or less harsh." Id. at 413-14. More
recently, in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1969) , a California court invalidated an exaction imposed by a public authority pursuant
to its approval of a rezoning application, despite the latter's insistence that the exaction
would redound to the developer's economic benefit. " [ F] ulfi llment of public needs emanat
ing from the proposed land use is the sine qua nori of the exaction's reasonableness," the
court insisted. Id. at 422, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Further, it reasoned :
Standing alone, the landowner's economic benefit supplies inadequate under
pinning for the exaction. The police power forms the exaction's constitutional
foundation. That power is aimed at public need, not private profit. The landowner
shcnld be free to reject the paternalism which forces him into an exaction con
ceived for his personal benefit.
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A straightforward way of testing the proposition is to ask what the
Ramapo result would have been had the town simply barred subdivision for
1 8 years, wholly ignoring the restriction's private economic impacts. Prior case
law and the obviously drastic nature of that restriction leave little doubt that
the court would have struck down the plan as confiscatory. But through its
elaborately crafted network of economic trade-offs-none of which, incidently,
entails direct dollar compensation-the Ramapo plan was saved from this
outcome and, more to the point, demonstrated that there is indeed a middle
ground between the police and eminent domain powers.
But isn't the argument plausible that the plan's economic trade-offs
simply brought the 18-year restriction under the police power's "reasonable; ness" umbrella ? Yes, if it is conceded that the police power has developed since
the time when P rofessor Freund wrote into two separate branches, each with
its di stinctive "reasonableness" test. Wh ichever labels are chosen, however, the
essential point, r eflected in Rarnapo, is that there is a class of regulatory

measures that fits neither into the traditional p olice nor eminent domain power
niches and that escapes the confiscation objection only by affording burdened
landowners fair comp ensation in the form of appropriate economic trade-offs.
I prefer the accommodation power label because it promises to nurture

a

"fairness discipline"153 that is all too often ignored when measures are in
discriminately lumped under the police power heading. The label signals more
clearly the necessity for a form of accounting that, while less demanding than
that of formal eminent domain, is assuredly more searching than its traditional
police power equivalent. The latter's impressionistic and typically conclusion
ary speculation, tied to some vague "balancing" of public and private interests,
invites grave injustice when restrictions of the magnitude of those in Ramapo
and Just154 are i n issue.
The label also promises greater rationality in judicial opinions evaluating
borderline restrictions. I llustrative of the confusion that currently reigns in
the reports are the federal district155 and circuit court156 opinions in A rt Neon

Company v. City and County of Denver. In t reating the plaint of billboard
interests that a six-year amortization provision of Denver's sign ordinance was
con fiscatory, both courts became ensnared in the conceptual inadequacies of
police and eminent domain doctrine, as traditionally conceived.157 The lower
court (Art Neon I ) defined as the issue whether or not the amortization proId. at 422, 79 Cal. Rp�r. at 880. Taken together, Hadacheck and Scrntton emphasize that

!he abse.nce of economic benefit t? the landowner does not impugn a police power measure,
JUSt as its presence does not validate as a police power measure a restriction purportedly
founded on that power.
153. The phrase is that of Professor Michelman. See Michelman supra note 17
'
'
at 1246.
1 54. See notes 1 1 7, 126, 142-52 and accompanying text supra.
155. 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973 ) .
156. 488 F.2d 1 1 8 ( 10th Cir. 1974) .
157. Although only Art Neon I and II 3:r� d�scussed _in
text, the d isagreement of
these two courts recurs in the volwninous h tigatJon dealing
with nonconforming use
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vision afforded j ust compensation for a formal taking. 1118 Adverting to a United
States Supreme Court159 holding that, in leasehold condemnation cases gener
ally, just compensation must include a premium for the likelihood of leasehold
renewal (a routine practice among billboard lessors and lessees ) , the court
ruled that the amortization period alone failed to measure up, and it admon
ished that "legislative rough approximations of just compensation won't do . "160
But in the eyes of the circuit court (Art Neon I I ) , eminent domain law
had nothing to do with the piece. To the appellate court, the case turned in
stead on the amortization provision's "reasonableness" under the police
power.161 Rebuking the trial court, it proclaimed that the reasonableness test
"is not a test of concept of 'just compensation,' " and that the amortization
technique "contains no connotation of compensation or a requirement there
for."162 But its analysis belied these categorical assertions on two counts. First,
the considerations it enumerated in profiling the reasonableness test contra
dicted the court 's alleged disinterest in the provision's compensatory dimen
sion. These included :
the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the structure,
the location, what part of the individual's total business is concerned,
the time periods, salvage, depreciation for income tax purposes, and
depreciation for other purposes, and the monopoly or advantage, if
any, resulting from the fact that similar new structures are prohibited
in the same area. 168
If the provision were a police power exercise, pure and simple, most of these

considerations would be gratuitous ; like the factors identified in Ramapo,
they speak to the mitigation of private loss, not to the prevention of land
uses that, in Professor Freund's formulation, are "harmful" to the public.
amortization measures. As with these two cases, the opinions conflict sharply in their
assessment of whether these measures are police power- or eminent domain power-based.
Compare Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 ( Mo . 1965) (eminent domain ) , with
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 ( 1954) ( police power) .
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1 134 ( 1968 ) .
Other opinions can b e found, however, which implicitly recognize that neither power
affords an appropriate predicate for these measures. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co.
v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 ( 1%8) ; Grant v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 ( 1 957) . As noted in text, see text
accompanying note 68 supra, Grant concedes its w illingness to place amortization on a
police power footing only because of the awkwardness of eminent domain doctrine. And
though Naegele too terms amortization a police power exercise, its analysis falls just short
of treating it as an eminent domain concept. Hence, it reasons :
If the value of the plaintiff's property interest was extinguished before the
running of the three-year [amortization ] period, there would be no taking, or if
the value of freedom from new competition for the stat"Jtory period equalled
the value of the property interest remaining at the end of the period, there would
be just compensation [sic] for the taking.
Id. at SOI, 162 N.W.2d at 213.
1 58. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 357 F. Supp. 466, 471, 473 (D.
Colo. 1973) .
159. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States; 409 U.S. 470
( 1 973 ) .
160. Art Neon Co. v . City and County o f Denver, 3 5 7 F. Supp. 466, 478 (D. Colo.
1973) .
161. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 121 ( 10th Cir. 1974) .
162. Id.
163. Id. at 122.
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Second the cour t expressly relie d upon Berm
, and qu ot e d i n full J u stice
its bro d reading of the police power's scope
a p l a n n i n g goa l . ' 6.4 As noted
Douglas' famou s dictum extolling aesthe tics as
pol ice power but w i t h the pro
earlier,165 however, Berman dealt not with the
urban r e newal purposes .
priety of governmental use of eminen t domai n for
govern ment may pursue
Since the questio n in Art Neon was not whethe r
d t hat it could- but
aesthetic goals-the litigants and both courts concede
achieve t hose goals
whether governm ent must compensat e when it seeks to
i napposite . Its role
iously
obv
is
by eliminati ng u� sightly bil lboar d s , B erman
as the centerpiece of the circuit cou r t ' s op i ni o n does point up, perhaps unwit

�

tingly, that court's ambi v alence on t h e compensat ion problem.

In short, the circuit court was c o r rect in its premise that the reasonable
ness test "is not a test of 'just com pensat i on . ' " but wrong in concluding there
fore that the amort i z ation technique contains " ' no connotation of com p ensation
o r a requ irement t h e refor . " 1 6 6 This non sequ itur resulted because the court
failed to recognize that fair compensation was an intermediate approach be
tween j ust com pe n sat ion and no compensa t i on, despite its use of reasoning
that in fact pointed in this direction. One wou l d l tave liked t o have seen
opinion, an A r t N con I ,Yi as it wer e, in which the

co n

a

third

c e p tu al in adequacies

of tired police power/eminent dom a i n doc t r i n e were fra n k l y ack nowledged
and the correspo n ding need for a t h i r d alternative acldressed . 1 67
164. Id. at 1 2 1 .
165. See text accompanying notes 59-67 rnpra.
166. 488 F .2d at 1 2 1 .
16?. A n �xample of implicit j udicial use of t h e Spectrum o f Land U s e I ntensity ap
pears m . Just1ce Hall's opinion in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany
T;oy Hills, 40 N . J . 539, 1 93 A.2d 232 ( 1 963 ) ( Morris County I ) . Rej ected as uncon
_
stt ;.ittonally
confiscatory m that case. was the zoning of the developer-plainti ff's land as
a , Meadows Development Zone." This classification precluded him from any but agricul
tural or aquaculture-related uses . Embroidering somewhat on the facts i n Morris Coimf\'
I, the parc�l's economic value might be portrayed as fol lows on t h e Spectrum of Land
Use Intensity :
_
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�

�
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2. The Legislatures: Transferable Development Rights ( TDR) as a
Harbinger of the Acc ommodation Power.
a. A n Overview of TDR Programs.168 TDR programs modify conven
tional property conceptions in two respects . First, they divide "property" into
If the court had deemed the zoning a literal taking, it would have had no choice
but to direct the township to pay for the less-than-fee interest "condemned" or, at the
least, to leave the land unzoned, freeing the developer to do as he wished with it. In
fact, Justice Hall approved neither alternative. Disdaining any discussion of payment,
he warned that voiding all zoning "would permit the establishment of any use by any
means-a result which might well be damaging t o the overall local public interest."
Id. at 559, 193 A.2d 243-44. Instead, he directed the township to increase the parcel's
development potential sufficiently to cure the constitutional obj ection, but authorized it
to give full weight, consistent with constit'.itional constraints, to the "special character
istics and particular problems of the district." Id. at 559, 193 A.2d at 244. The decree
splits the difference between the extremes of the police and eminent domain power
resolutions. Cf. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-1 12(3) ( Proposed Official
Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as CODE] .
Morris County I shows that there is an alternative to leaving the land "completely
unzoned" when a regulation is declared invalid. See Enclos1tre, supra note 30, at 1253. For
results analogous to Morris County I , see, e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of
Richton Park, 1 9 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 ( 1 960) ; City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217
So. 2d 836 ( Fla. 1969 ) . See generally 2 C. R.ATH KOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING A N D PLAN
NING, ch. 36, § 6 ( 3 d ed. 1972) . The view that invalidation leaves the land unzoned may
be shaped in part by the loose assertion in some precedents that if the courts went fur
ther, they would violate the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Fairfax County v.
Allman, 215 Va. 434, 2 1 1 S.E.2d 48 ( 1 975 ) ; City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, supra. This
is a misconception. Justice Hall's resohtion only brackets the area on the Spectrum of
Land Use Intensity within which the township may permissibly zone ; it does not mandate
a specific outcome for local legislative officials. Moreover, some interpenetration of j udicial
and legislative roles in this area is inevitable. A better explanation for the j udicial defer
ence is the greater familiarity of legi slators with local circumstances, planning goals,
and resources allocable to compensatory regulation.
A direct judicial application of the accommodation power would occur where, in
an "eminent domain" proceeding, the condemnee successfully attacks the zoning of his
parcel as confiscatory, and the court provides for its valuation on a Reasonable' Beneficial
Use level rather than on its status as "unzoned,"--i.e., its Highest and Best Use Unre
stricted by Public Regulation. Cf. CODE § 5-303 ( 5 ) . Al though this result would seem to be
called for by Justice Hall's reasoning, a New Jersey intermediate court granted relief
based on the Highest and Best Use standard in a companion case to Morris County I,
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Morris County Land Improvement Co., 91 N.J.
Super. 40, 219 A.Zd 180 (App. Div. 1966) (Morris County II) . While Morris County I
was pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the power company initiated eminent
domain proceedings to acquire a public utility easement over nine acres of the developer's
land. Prior to the completion of those proceedings, Justice Hall rendered his decision.
Had the Morris County II court honored Hall's reasoning, the nine acres would have
been valued on a Reasonable Beneficial Use level, which pres·Jmably would have been
skewed between its Resource Protection level ( Meadowlands Development Zone) and its
Allowable Use level ( Gravel Extraction ) . Instead, the court opted for the H ighest and
Best Use Unrestricted by Public Regulation level ( Industrial ) , incorrectly assuming
that Morris County I
must be held as having declared the " Meadows Development Zone" regulations
void in their very inception. Accordingly, there was no valid zoning regulation
with regard to the property in question at the time of the taking, and defendant
was entitled to an instruction [refused by the trial court] to that effect.
Id. at 49, 219 A.2d at 184. The Morris Cotinty II result, apparently replicated elsewhere,
see Zogby v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 740, 279 N.Y.S.2d 665 ( Ct. Cl., N.Y. 1967 ) , is unfortu
nate both in its failure . to heed Justice Hall's actual reasoning and in its resulting imposi
tion of an indefensible surcharge on the public fisc-results that could be avoided in
future litigation of this type by explicit use of the accommodation power.
168. For more detailed treatment of the T D R concept, see, e.g., THE TRANSFER OF
DEVELOPM ENT RIGHTS : A N EW TECH NIQUE OF LAND UsE REGULATION ( Rose ed. 1975 ) ;
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An E.xploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 ( 1 973) ;
Transferable Development Rights (ASPO PAS Report No. 304, Mar. 1975 ) ; Transfer
of Development Rights, 34 URBAN LAND 1 ( 1 975 ) .
Specific TDR proposals and accompanying case studies include J . CosTONIS & J.
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planning goals and of the capacity of the districts' physical and service infra
structures to absorb the density. Next, machinery for the actual transfer of

SHLAES, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS · A SoLUTI
T? C H r CAGo's LANDMARKS
.
DILEMMA ( Chicago Chapter Foundation of th� AmCncan nstitute of Architects & Na
tional Trust for Historic Preservation 1 97 1 ) J
T N
SPACE ADRIFT : LANDMARK
PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE ( 1 974) '( : h � i rtIS,De oy and Ra i Okamoto) ;
V
P u E.R1:o. Rrco �LAN, supra. In the .first of these ��ies 0Mr. Shlaes
prepared the economic
feas1b1hty �ectlon and contributed major insights t I'ts, conceptual �nd legal portions. Mr.
De Voy, aide� by his associates at Real Estate R�se�rc� Cor 13orat1o n, prepare d the basic
draft and reviewed the final draft of the economic
( and 4 ) of SPACE ADRIFT
supra, as well as providing valuable assistance o�
�R study as a whole ; Mr'.
��
am?to played a sin:iilar role regarding the urban design c. apter ( 5 ) of
ew1se! the ec�nom1cs section of the PUERTO Rico PLA� is the work of SPACE ADRIFT.
Mr. De Voy'
w o agam con!ributed broadly to that study's oth. er sections .
Other pertment TDR studies are referenc d m t�e. footnotes to the
subsection that
fol�ows: A more complete TDR bibliogra h :nd a I � g of pend ing
or adopted TDR
legislation can be found in Transferable D
lopment Rigmhts, supra at 63-64.
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rights must be set in motion. Under some schemes, transfers occur exclusively
between private landowners subject to general public supervision. Under
others, only government can transfer the rights, and the resulting income is
used to create an "Envi ronmental Trust Fund"169 from which cash awards
are made to resource owners. A mixed pattern of private and governmental
transfers is prescribed by a third variant ; here, government makes the transfer
only if the resource owner declines to d o so. Again, the income generated
through public sale i s used to cancel the costs to government of compensating
affected owners. I n return for compensation, the resource owner must provide
firm assurances that his site will be developed consistently with the Resource
Protection restrictions ; typically, a less-than-fee protective interest is con
veyed to government for this purpose.
Lastly, criteria must be devised to d etermine exactly what the owner
ought to receive for his losses under the p rogram, whether payment is made
in development rights or in dollars. Two patterns prevail . One determines
the compensation b y measuring the difference between the quantity of rights
actually used at the resource site and the total quantity of rights authorized
for the site by existing zoning.17° For example, if a landmark site i s currently
zoned to permit the construction of an office building containing 1 ,000,000
square feet and t h e landmark itself contains only 250,000 square feet, the
site's owner may t ransfer the remaining 750,000 square feet or, under TDR
programs incorporating the cash alternative, receive a dollar award equal to
the value of that increment of space. The second pattern, on the other hand,
entitles the resource owner to tran sfer only that quantity of rights--or to
receive its cash equivalent-required to take up the slack between the economic
return possible at his site under the Resource Protection zoning and the return
under zoning fixed at the Reasonable Beneficial Use level .171 If a marginal
increase in development potential would not endanger the protected resource,
government may alternatively increase t h e site's development potential to the
latter level, much as it does when it grants a variance under traditional zoning
procedures.172
Should TDR be predicated on the eminent domain power, on the police
power or on the accommodation power ? Before that question can b e answered,
it is necessary to identify the particular TDR variant addressed. Aside from
possible procedural complications, the question can confidently b e answered
for those TDR variants that compensate the resource owner in dollars for
169. The Environmental Trust Fund is an element of the proposal advanced in the
PUERTO Rrco PLAN, supra note 13, at 9-24.
170. This approach is taken, inter alia, under the New York City TDR program
for landmark preservation. See New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 7479, 74-791 to -793 ( 1975 ) . See generally Gilbert, Saving Landmarks: The Transfer of
Development Rights, 22 HIST. PRESERVATION 1 3 ( 1970) .
171. For an example of this approach, see PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note l3, at 9-24.
172. Id.
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compensation in the form of d eve l op m e nt r i g-lit s is 111a1 1 c la t ory. not optional,
with the resource owner.174 Further, the quantum of t ra n sicrable right s is
173. See text accompanying notes 79-89 .rnprn.
The position offered in text reflects a su bs tant i a l l'V< > l u t io11 . , f m y \' l <'W 0 11 tlw con
stitutional status of development rights as adequat<· rompensa t i l l t t 1 11 a11 ea r l i r r art irle,
I posed, but did not resolve, the question whether T D R would lw co11s t i t u t ionally 11<-fec
tive because development rights arc not cash compl'nsation a11d. i 1 1 t l w ,·as•· of j m i,di("tions
permitting special benefits to be set-off a ga i 1 1 t the pared tak .. 1 1 . hn·aus•· dt·Hl1 1pt11t•nt
rights might be deemed to have too s pecu l a t ive a value t o qualify a s spt·c ial lw11cft t s . Sec
Costonis, The Chica5;0 Pla11 : l11cn1li<•r Zm1i11y a11d th1· / 'r1·St"n·11 1 i .. 11 "! l " r l•an l.m1d
marks, 85 HARV. L. REv. 574, 598 n.75 ( 1 972 ) . A s in c l i, a t cd i n t<- x t , l 1 1 1 w rn·r. I a111 now
confident, first, that the dollar compensation o bj ec t i o n i s not c1 1n1p1· l l i 1 1 g if T i l l{ is
predicated on the accommodation power, ancl. second, that i n j u r i sd i,· t io11s p•· r111 i t t i111( t he
set-off of special benefits aga i ns the parcel taken, <kvelop111t·11t r i i.: h t s 0111-:hl rk:irly to
qualify as special benefits even from the pe r s pec t i l' of ,·111i11t·nt d o 1 1 1 ai 1 1 doc t r i1w. The
latter j udgment i s th e direct outgrowth of the three cast· t ml i · s mtdl'rtaken by thl' writer
with Messrs. Sh laes and De Voy, see note 1 6 8 rnprn. wh ich arl' pnsuasi vc that the
value of development rights is no more spec ul at i e and, in fact. a i.:ood d l' a l less sn. than
other . economic opportunities that have traditionally c om po r t e d w i t h the special ht·nefits
doctrme.
1_7�. Fur-Lex Realty, Inc. v . Lindsay, 376 N . Y . S.2cl 388 ( Su p . Ct. 1975 1 ronfirms
that It 1 s the mandatory character of T D R as forced compensation rather than the TOR
concept itself that will prove a sticking point for the courts . .-\ t i s ul' i n t h a t c a s e was
t �e validity of a transaction in which the City of !'\ew York en t e r ed i11to a lease of the
site of the Appel late Division ( First D istrict) Courthouse, a designated lanclmark. which
enabled the lessee, th� owner of an adj oining site. to transfer 1 00 .000 q uar e feet of the
unused development nghts of the Courthouse site to his site. The Courthouse s i te was then
sub.leased back to t�e city for cont_inued; use as a courthouse. less thl' d e e l op m e n t rights.
This arrangement !S further descnbed m Coston is, Thr ("ltifOqo P/1111 foa·nti;·,· Zo11i11g
:
an<! the Preservat on of Urbait Landmarks, 85 HARV.
L. RF.v. 5 74, 586 n.44 ( 1972 ) .
�
_
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equal in value to the difference between his site's Resource Protection and
Reasonable Beneficial Use values rather than between its Resource Protection
and Allowable Use ( o r higher ) values. Since this variant clearly conflicts
with eminent domain's standard of just compensation, the question i s whether
it rests instead on the police or the accommodation power. Under the ana
lytical framework developed in this article, the answer is the accommodation
power.
t.

The Police Power: A Dubious Predicate

for

TDR. My view is not

universally shared. Norman Marcus, for example, has placed TDR squarely
on a police power footing.1711 In his argument, he advances a cogent, indeed
brilliant, analysis of TDR's two basic postulates :

first, that strong legal,

planning and policy considerations favor the concept of severing development
rights from their host parcel and transferring them to other land ;176 and sec
ond, that "because the essence of property [ i n 20th century America] is its
potential for profitable use"177 and not its "location in space and dominion
over a defined surface of land"178 as in earlier times, authorizing resource
owners to transfer their frozen development rights can be a fair and practicable
way of mitigating their losses.
But to conclude from these premises that TDR is therefore founded on
the police power is unpersuasive. The conclusion resurrects the misconception
fathered by the Holmes aphorism and compounded, perhaps inadvertently, in
Berman v. Parker that "regulation" is the exclusive province of the police

power. In reality, regulation is a goal of all three powers-police, accommo
dation and eminent domain.179 The conclusion, moreover, does violence to the
settled view, formulated by Professor Freund and consistently affirmed in
precedent, that the police power's object is to safeguard community health,
safety and welfare independently of any concern for compensating burdened
landowne rs.180 TDR's raison d'etre, on the other hand, is precisely to insure
that landowners are fairly treated. Finally, the conclusion's reliance on the
vague "reasonableness" test of current police power doctrine threatens to
erode the fairness discipline nurtured by TDR because it implies that TDR's
compensatory supplements are a matter of legislative grace and not a consti
tutional imperative.181
Perhaps my disagreement with Marcus is l ittle more than a qiterelle des
mots between friends coming at the compensation question from opposite

directions. Obviously more sympathetic to The Taking Issue's philosophy

175. See Marcus Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause :
The Case of Manhatt:in's Tudor City Parks, 24 BuFF. L: REv. 77, 77-78, 104-05 ( 1974) .
176. Id. at 89-94.
177. Id. at 88.
178. Id. at 87.
179. See text accompanying notes 52-67 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 150-52 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 153-67 supra.
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than I, Marcus questions why, since the Fifth Amendment is given short shrift
under recent environmentally-oriented decisions, conscientious governmental
efforts to extend some compensation to resource owners should not prevail
when challenged on confiscation grounds.182 Skeptical of that philosophy's
fairness and its accuracy as a portrayal even of recent taking j u risprudence, 183
I am a good deal more reluctant to fold TDR into the spongy batter of police
power reasoning. I n our results, however, we are not far apart. Marcus alludes
to two kinds of compensation-the more stringent j ust compensation of em
inent domain law and the less exacting "equitable" o r "fair" compensation
of TDR. Our difference is that h e urges employment of the latter "where

legitimate police power restrictions on private property are at issue."184 As I
have acknowledged earlier,185 linking fair compensation to the police power
is not an inherently implausible course, but the basic transformation of the
police power which such a linkage works must be understood clearly by plan
ning authorities and the courts. Because I am apprehensive that it will not
be understood, the linkage approach is less satisfactory in my j udgment than
recognition of an independent accommodation power.
ii.

The Accommodation Power: A More Fitting Predicate for TDR.

The Tudor Parks decision, discussed below, confirms that TDR will be chal
lenged because it does not measure up to formal eminent domain standards.
The challenge should not succeed. A TDR program's validity should depend
instead upon whether its promise of compensation is real or illusory. If those
rights, together with the economic return possible under the parcel's Resource
Protection zoning, satisfy the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard, the matter
should end there. But if the development rights certificates are mere bogus
bills cranked out on some government printing press, firm j udicial i ntervention
is in order.
Fear that development rights will afford illusory compensation recurs in
commentary186 contesting TDR's

constitutionality and

tipped the balance

against the TDR program in Tudor Parks. Concern on this score is certainly
not unreasonable but it should be tempered with an appreciation of the formal
requirements of constitutional argument and of the capabilities of standard
appraisal practice. As to the first, it is important to distinguish facial consti
tutional challenges from challenges to a measure as applied. The marketability
of development rights would be in issue in a facial challenge only if the premise
of marketability were so far-fetched as to be absurd. B ut appraisal sources
182. See Marcus, supra note 1 75, at 104.
183. See notes 1 28, 134 supra.
1 84. Marcus, supra note 1 75, at 104 (emphasis added) .
185. See text accompanying note 1 53 supra.
186. See Note, The Unconstitutional1ty of Transferabl
e Development Rights 84
YALE L.J. 1 10 1 ( 1 975 ) ; Note, Development Rights Transfers
in New York City s� r•
""a
note 1 74.
•
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and judicial precedent established just the opposite. Appraisal theory187 and at
least three TDR case studies188 fully support the unsurprising proposition
that increasing a parcel's development potential by transferring development
rights to it will increase its fair market value, so long as there is a market
demand for new construction incorporating the transferred rights. Whether
that market will exist, of course, is a fact question, turning wholly upon the
contingencies affecting the litigant's parcel and the relevant TDR program and
land use regime.
Judicial support appears indirectly i n numerous decisions equating prop
erty rights with the right to exploit land for profit189 and directly in the major
ity190 and concurring191 opinions in the New York Court of Appeals' decision,

Newport Associates, Inc.

v.

Solow. Disputed in that case was whether the

holder of a long-term lease could transfer the leased parcel's unused develop
ment rights to an adj oining parcel. The question was resolved favorably to
the defendant -lessee on the ground that t h e lease did not by its terms preclude
the transfer. More important for our purposes is language in both opinions
explicitly describing the contested development rights as a "valuable asset."192
Judge Breitel' s concurring comments in this regard merit quotation in full :
Plaintiff has lost by defendant's action . . . a valuabl e asset in the
air development rights over its building. It has thereby lost its right
to "transfer" or use its air development rights by alienation of the
reversion to an abutting owner, or by acquiring an abutting property.
That right to transfer or exploit the air development rights required
no warrant in the zoning ordinance. Air rights, including the special
floor area ratios defined in the ordinance, are valuable and transfer
able, even if only as an (ldjunct to a reversion or to a long-term lease
hold.193
The appropriate mode, therefore, for challenging a TDR program is as it
applies to specific landowners. Centering on the marketworthiness of the
rights, such challenges will require careful preparation by the resource owner
and the planning authority, and will call for substantially more than the im
pressionistic j udicial scrutiny typifying current zoning litigation. On the other
hand, they will be markedly less taxing for the courts and litigants than are
formal eminent domain proceedings. Standard appraisal methodologies and
187. See, e.g., Shlaes, The Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL
J. 526 ( 1 974) ; Graaskamp, Impressions on the Marketability of TDRs (ASPO PAS

Report No. 304, Mar. 1 975 ) .
188. See note 1 68, supra.
189. See, e.g., Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 1 9 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278
N.Y.S.2d 185 ( 1 966) ; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 ( 1923 ) .
190. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 ( 1 972 ) , cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931.
191. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y. S.2d at 621.
192. Id. at 267, 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620, 621.
193. Id. at 268, 283 N. E.2d at 602-03, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621.

1068

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 75 : 1021

market analysis techniques can establish the value of development rights with
a degree of precision that will enable the courts to insure that resource owners
are not gouged.194 Nor should it be forgotten that the courts are not strangers
to the types of valuation questions posed by TDR. This p oi n t is under scored
by the large volume of litigation dealing with such matters as benefit assess
ment levies, special benefits in partial takings situations, and growth control
and resource protection programs-which, if the thesis

of this article is

correct, are harbingers of the accommodation power. And with the wildfire
adoption of these programs in the 70's, a corresponding increase in judicial
familiarity with, and sophistication in resolving, questions arising under that
power can be anticipated.
b.

Tudor Park s : Old Wine in New Bo ttles. The occasion for the Tudor

Parks litigation was N ew York City's enactment of a TDR program195 in
1972 to bar the construction that the R - 1 0 zoning then in effect permitted
on two privately owned parks surrounded by the Tudor City apartment-hotel
complex. The program places the parks in a P overlay district, limiting their
use to passive recreational uses, and authorizes the developer-owner to transfer
their full complement of unused rights to a mid-Manhattan transfer district ;
it also requires that the parks be opened to the general public but only after
the city has certified the first transfer of rights from them.196 In permitting
the transfer authorization to exceed the minimum amount of rights necessary
to insure a Reasonable Beneficial Use return, the program is more lenient
than our hard case. It is significant too that land values in the commercially
zoned transfer district, where the developer-owner has extensive holdings,
are double those in the residentially zoned Tudor City area197-although this
advantage must be temporarily discounted in light of the currently overbuilt
state of New York City's office-commercial space market.
Despite these advantages, the developer's self-initiated attempt to transfer
the park's rights to a contemplated proj ect sited adjacent to the Tudor City
complex,198 and the tender of a "substantial offer"199 to the developer for
the rights transferable under the TDR p rogram, both the developer and its
mortgagee brought an inverse condemnation action against the city. They
sought summary j udgment on the ground that the P zoning is a literal taking
for which j u st compensation must be paid. Although the trial court agreed
that

a

"taking" had occurred, it did not award compensation, but reinstated

the prior R- 1 0 zoning classification instead.200
1 94. See authorities cited in notes 1 68, 187 supra.
195. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, art. IX, §§ 91 -00 et seq. ( 1973 ) .
196. For a detailed discussion o f the Tudor Parks T D R program, see Marcus, suprn
note 1 75, at 79-85.
197. Id. at 83-84.
198. Id. at 80-8 1 .
199. Id. at 84, n.22.
200. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N ew York, 77 Misc. 2d 1 99, 204-05, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762, 767-68 ( Sup. Ct. 1973 ) .
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Employing a divide-and-conquer rationale, the court rigidly compart
mentalized the program's two components, evaluating each in isolation from
the other. Looking first to the P zoning, it concluded that the use restriction
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power because it "significantly
deprives the [mortgagee] of its security for the mortgage," and "bars the
[developer] from any economic use of [ its] .property. "201 Were P zoning
the whole of the program, of course, the court's reasoning would be incontro-·
vertible. Indeed, the program would then be the legal equivalent of a Ramapo
plan which retained only the 18-year subdivision restriction and not the net
work of economic t rade-offs that saved that restriction from invalidation.
But there is more to the Tudor Parks program-namely, its transfer
component. If the court had treated this component as an integral part of the
overall scheme, it might have altered its conclusion that the P zoning was
enacted under the police power, and tested the compensation afforded by the
transfer authorization against a measure less demanding than that of eminent
domain law. Regrettably, the court did neither ; instead, its assessment of the
transfer authorization is as perfunctory as it is unenlightening. Viewing the
authorization as evidence that the city recognized the "need of some modicum
of compensation, "202 the court dismissed it in the following single sentence :
Pursuant to [ the TDR program] the owner is confronted with
the problem of acquiring 30,000 square feet of property suitable for
his purpose in the newly proscribed [ sic] area but he is left to his
own resources for acquisition and funding in what may be an unpre
dictable market of the future.203
The trial court's opinion is unfortunate, both in its offhand consideration
of the transfer authorization's potential as fair compensation and in its deci
sion to invalidate the TDR program by summary judgment. In neither regard
does its handling of the case respect the constraints attaching to what was
really a constitutional attack on a TDR program as applied. This is not neces201 . Id. at 202-03, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
202. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
203. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
The court erred in its assumption that the TDR program limits transfers only to
transferee sites that the transferor owns. In fact, the rights are transferable to sites of
non-transferors as well, thereby vastly enlarging their market. See New York, N.Y.,
Zoning Resolution art. IX § § 99-00 et seq. ( 1 973 ) . Also prejudicial in the program's
analysis was the court's implication that the developer's prospects for financial success
at the Tudor Parks' site is all but guaranteed, while development elsewhere would be
a high risk venture. As the unhappy outcome of the Old Stock Exchange controversy,
see text accompanying notes 251 -52, warns, however, prospects for success in either case
are hardly assured. Relevant to this point is Ada Louise Huxtable's tongue-in-cheek
suggestion that, in view of the collapse of New York City's office space market in the
early 70's, the owner of the Grand Central Terminal should perhaps compensate the
City of New York for rescuing it from the financial debacle that almost certainly would
have occurred had it not been blocked by the city from going ahead with plans for
the construction of a second Pan American-type office building atop that landmark struc�
ture. See, Huxtable, Why Did We Lose Grand Central as a Landmark?, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1975, § 2 ( Arts & Leisure), at 26, col. 1 . The litigation arising from the city's
attempt to prevent this constraction is discussed in notes 210, 229 infra.
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sarily to claim that the result should go the other way if premised on
thorough consideration of

Tudor Parks'

a

facts, but rather to underscore that,

by failing to make proper inquiry, the court reached its conclusion in an
informational vacuum.
Paradoxically, the ingredients that might have l e d to a denial of the
summary j udgment motion and a trial on the compensation question are
present in the trial court' s reasoning. To its credit, t h e court rej ected the
plaintiffs' premise that the police and eminent domain powers are correla
tives .204 B y dismissing their inverse condemnation claim out of hand, it rec
ognized that a regulatory measure exceeding the police power's ambit is not

ipso facto

an exercise of the eminent domain power. Further, it affirmed the

Reasonable Beneficial Use standard as the determinant of when a regulatory
measure requires compensation.205 I n remarking on the developer's earlier
self-initiated request

for

a transfer

authorization,206

moreover, the court

surely was aware that, even from the developer's viewpoint, the TDR solution
contains enough promise of recompense to be taken seriously. Again, it appears
to have had a glimmering of the propriety of intermediate compensatory
formats b ecause it spoke of a "modicum of compensation"207 and of compensa
tion that is "fair" and "reasonable."208 Finally, it appreciated the futility of
forcing the city down the eminent domain path in observing that the cost of
9
outright public acquisition of t h e parks would be "extremely high . " 20

Tudor Parks
the author of the

is now pending before the New York Court of Appeals. As

Ramapo

and

Newport Associates

decisions, that tribunal, it

can b e ventured, will prove more discerning in its evaluation of these factors.
Hopefully, it will not overlook the opportunity that

Tudor Parks

affords for

the "re-examination of . . . j udicial and legal thinking i n [the compensation]
area" called for by Judge Breitel in

Ramapo .210

204. Id. at 204-05, 352 N.Y.S2d 767-68.
205. Id. at 202, 352 N.Y.S.2d 765-66.
206. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d 764.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 203, 352 N.Y.S.2d 766.
209. Id. at 204, 352 N.Y. S.2d 767.
210. A lthough the discussion in text focuses on Tudor Parks, its ramifications for
two recent New York cases invalidating landmark designations as takings are patent
because the TDR option provided under the New York City landmarks program, see
note 1 70 snpra, was available to both landmark owners. See Lutheran Church in America
v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 3 1 6 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y. S.2d 7 ( 1974) (J . P.
Morgan Mansion ) and Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, Index No.
14763/69 ( Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1 975 ) ( Grand Central Terminal ) . Of the two cases,
Lutheran Church is the more inexplicable because the landmark owner had not made
a factual showing of economic hardship, absent which the Reasonable Beneficial Use
�tandard _ presumably ought to have applied to bar its taking claim. See Lutheran Church
m America y. Ci�y of � ew York, id. at 132, 316 N . �.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17
(Ja_sen, J., d1ssentmg) . Smee the court expressly reframed from declaring the landmark
o;dmance facially invalid, see id. at 131, 3 1 6 N.E.2d a t 3 1 1 , 359 N.Y. S .2d at 16, and yet
�1d not have before it facts establishing the ordinance's invalidity as applied its decision
is doubly puzzling. Moreover, even if economic hardship is a ssumed the c� urt's failure
to examinl'. th<; TDR op.tion'� suitability as an adequate compensator alternative hardly
squares with its reasomng m Ramapo, see text accompanying notes 145-52 supra, a

y
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Institutional Responsibilities Under the Accommodation Power

1 . lntegra.tion of the Police and Eminent Doniain Powers : An In
complete Model.
A convenient point of departure for deciding who should do what under
the accommodation power is to look at its closest theoretical analogue-the
notion of "integrating" the police and eminent domain powers. A perennial
source of contention among the commentators, this notio n has precipitated a
cleavage as sharp as the one dividing the police power enthusiasts and the
private marketeers, whose dispute derives from roughly parallel considerations.
Opponents of integration2 11-which they tend to equate with permitting
inverse condemnation actions against regulatory authorities-have put forth
a catalog of by-now familiar objections : the notion's potential for unexpected
and drastic liability would inhibit public planning initiatives ; its reliance on
monetary relief to cure "illegal" public actions rather than on injunctive relief
(which merely revokes the defective regulation) is misconceived ; integration
would put courts in the business of allocating public resources at the behest of
private claimants, instead of leaving that j ob to legislatures responding to
general public needs ; and, finally, it is pregnant with all manner of adminis
trative c_omplexities-the kind of property interest if any (fee or less-than-fee,
permanent or temporary) that government would receive for the compensation
paid, which measure of compensation to prescribe, and the legal contingencies
point implicitly recognized by Judge Jasen in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Judge
Breitel joined. Id. a t 133 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 3 1 3 n.2, 359 N.Y. S.2d at 1 8 n.2.
Penn Central, on the other hand, is a twin to Tudor Parks in its blithe dismissal
of the TDR option. Dubiously interpreting Lutheran Church as holding that "landmarks
designation generally constitutes a taking for which compensation is mandated," id. at
8, the court rejected the TDR option with the blanket assertion that it "neither provided
compensation to plaintiffs nor minimized the harm suffered by plaintiffs due to the
designation of the Terminal as a landmark." Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New
York, Index No. 14763, Findings of Fact and Declarations of Law at 8 ( Sup. Ct. 1975 ) .
But the option clearly does both, as the city established at trial. The issue that the court
ought to have explored is a good deal more fine-grained : whether the extent of com
pensation or degree of minimization of harm afforded by the option (as well as by tax
abatement advantages and other concessions that the city has long afforded to Penn
Central and its predecessor) reduced the plaintiffs' inj ury to a level that comports
with the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard. Since the court failed to discuss the
standards that it was applying-though it apparently leaned strongly toward those of
eminent domain-its opinion is both elliptical and conclusory. Penn Central's oracular
posture, together with its extreme reading of the admittedly confusing Lutheran Church
d�ision, bespeaks tl:ie need for searching review and clarification in the appeal that the
city has lodged.
Taken together, Lutheran Church and Penn Central cast a pall not only on the
future of landmarks preservation in New York City, see Huxtable, Landmarks Are in
Trouble with the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1 974, § A at 2, col. 1, but on the entire
fabric of legitimate public governance so thoughtfully woven in Ramapo. A t their very
best, these cases represent a serious r.etrogression from Judge Breitel's call for the
� rely needed re-evaluation of outmoded doctrine that serves neither public nor private
mterests.
211. See, e.g., Beuscher, Some Tentative No tes on the fotegration of Police Power
and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968
URB.A� L. ANN. 1 ; Note, Inverse Condemnation : Its Availability in Challenging the
Validi ty of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 439 ( 1 974) ; 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1 1 34
( 1953 ) .
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circumscribing government's power to repeal obsolete restrictions.

Support

ers212 of integration counter with an equally familiar litany : requiring gov

by
exposing the true costs of regulation ; it would protect indiv idual liberty by

ernment to compensate would enhance rational public decision-making

safeguarding private rights from gover nmental over-reaching ; and it would
insure the integrity of comprehensive planning by preventing rather than
licensing discordant private development.
How is one to choose sides if, as this writer believes, the arguments of
both are equally plausible in the abstract ? Intelligent choice is

impossible

absent a coherent conception both of what is meant by "integration" and of
the quite different contexts to which it pertains. Current commentary and
case law afford neither. Their persistence in mis-equating the "police

p ower

with "regulation" retards progress on both counts. Further, while many

"

com

mentators have rightly impugned the either/or posture of current though t, 21 3
they have not as yet offered prescriptions that dissolve the policy and doctrinal
blockages of the two powers. Illustrative of unproductive j udicial attitudes
are the vague musings of one court about achieving fairer public governance
by "overlaying the police power with the requirement of j ust compensation,"214
a neat t rick which is likely to be about as helpful as trying to make toast by

plugging an

AC toaster into a DC circuit. 215

The debate's edge has been similarly dulled by its inattention to contexts.
Two can be identified, each entailing private challenges to a regulatory

pro

gram's restrictions, but differing from each other in terms of their legislative
character. The first, exemplified by conventional zoning, comprehends those
212. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, T H E ZONING GAME 1 68-72 ( 1966) ; Hadler, M1111icipal
Zo11i11g Liability ia Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URBAN LAW. 25 ( 1973 ) ; Van
Alstyne, Stat1itory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative
Power, 1 9 STAN. L. R EV. 727 ( 1967) ; B osselman, The Third A lternative in Zoning
Litigation, 1 7 ZONING DIGEST 1 1 3 ( 1 965 ) .
2 1 3. See authorities cited i n note 212 supra.
An especia lly thoughtful treatment of the inadequacies of the either/or syndrome
appears in th e Bossclman article c i ted in note 212 supra. Although Mr. Bosselman's
vi ews on the compensation question appear to have changed substantially in recent years,
s1·e T A K ING, supra note 5, his 1965 p ropo sal for a "third a lternative" to the traditional
pol i c� an� eminent domain power responses to that question is, in my j udgment, a fresh
contnbut 1011 to land use t h ough t . Despite fundamental differences between the approaches
ad voc at �d in that and the present article-Mr. Bosselman , for exam p le, does not call
for an mdcpendent third power as do I-Mr. Bosselman's thesis has significantly m
Ruen�ed the viewpoint expressed in this article, and my debt to him is substantial. It has
a l s<;> mRuenced t h e A LI Model Land Development Code, of which Mr. Bos se lm an is As
sociat c Reporter, with re s pec t to Code provisions a u thorizing courts to key eminent
_
do111a111 cornp<'nsation awards to what is an analogue to the Reasonable Beneficial Use
s ta ndard , .rrr Co<le § 5-303 ( 5 ) . a nd to grant local govern men ts the option of cu ring con
fi scat ory land u s e measures thro ugh compensation. Id. at § 9- 1 1 2 ( 3 ) .
2 1 4. H F H, Ltd. v . Superior Co�rt, 1 1 6 Cal. Rptr. 436, 44 1 ( 2d Dist. App. Ct. 1974) :
cf. B row n v. Tahoe Rc�1ona I Planmng Agency, 385 F.. Supp. 1 1 28 ( D. Nev. 1973 ) .
_
2 1 5 . T h e ovcrs1mphficat1on
that the po l i c e and eminent d o m a i n powers can somehow
be nll'TKCd o r . supenmposcd or� o.ne . a!1other w1. thout un dergo i ng a fundamental tran s
!ormat1.on m kmd also !I PPears m _J Ud1c1al reasonmg a pp r ov i ng programs i n which zoning
1 s pr�d1cated on the cmment domam power. See note 130 supra. See gen erally text accom
panymg notes 52-67.
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restrictions adopted by legislatures i n the good faith belief that they comport
with the police power.216 The second, illustrated by the kinds of resource
protection217 and growth management218 initiatives considered earlier, covers
borderline restrictions. Because they are recognized as such by the legislature,
it buttresses them with . a compensatory supplement, such as the network of
economic trade-offs i n

Ramapo

or TDR i n

Tudor Parks.

The legi slature may

direct the administering authority to extend the compensatory supplement
automatically, a s i n these examples, or it may provide that compensation be
afforded only if a court rules that, without it, the restriction would be in
valid.21 9 Under the first alternative, the court reviews the proffered compen
sation's compatibility with the fair compensation standard ; under the latter,
it decides the threshold question whether or not the restriction passes muster
under the police power. In neither case may it enjoin enforcement of the
restriction, however. Instead, it must provisionally grant appropriate compen
satory relief, staying its order for a reasonable period to allow the administer
ing agency to elect between compensating or, if necessary resources are lacking,
liberalizing the offending restriction in accordance with the Reasonable Bene
ficial Use standard.220
Restrictions i n this second context can be reviewed in alternative ways.
In one, the courts alone can pass on whether the challenged restriction is
constitutional as applied, and can fix fair compensation if the program of
which it is a part affords an insufficient compensatory supplement or none at
all.22 1 In the second, these responsibilities devolve initially upon an adminis
trative agency whose determinations o n both counts are expressly made
subject to judicial review.222
By introducing the accommodation power and distinguishing between the
two frameworks, the terms of the debate about integration are sufficiently
clarified, I believe, to weigh properly the various arguments advanced for and
against a more systematic compensation p ractice. Offered here is a compromise
position : private litigants should not be permitted to compel government to
compensate for overbroad regulatory measures ; but, to deal fairly with land
owners and to enhance the prospect for effective regulation,

government

should resort to the accommodation power whenever it recognizes beforehand
that restrictions it imposes may not be defensible under the police power.

216. For a treatment of alternative remedies that are appropriate in this frame
work, see text accompanying notes 49-51 and note 167 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra.
218. See text accompanying notes 145-53 supra.
. 219. See PUERTO Rrco PLAN, supra note 13 ; cf. text accompanying notes 233-51
infra, discussing Massachusetts statutes imposing height limitations adjacent to the state
capitol building and providing public access to the state's beaches.
220. An analogous judicial role is prescribed in Code § 9-1 12 ( 3) .
. 221. Cf. the Massachusetts statutes discussed in text accompanying notes 233-50
infra.

222 . See PUERTO Rrco PLAN,

supra

note 13, at 9-16.
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practice will unleash a firestorm of l itigation. It is difficult to gauge whether
accommodation power-based programs will generate more litigation than
arises currently from the practice of pushing the police power to its outer
limits and beyond. Experience in England225 and, on a more limited basis, at
home226 shows that surprisingly few claims tend to be prosecuted when com
pensation is afforded as a curative for overbroad regulatory measures. Litiga
tion can also be restrained, should a particular program nonetheless trigger a
large number of claims, by the use of administrative agencies to screen and,
in many instances, to dispose of these claims. Even a material increase in
litigation, however, would seem an acceptable price to pay for the concomitant
advantage of strengthening the legal, political and ethical foundations of
public governance.
The proposed resolution is also sensitive to the concerns of the advocates
of the integration notion although it does stop short of endorsing their in
sistence upon inverse condemnation as the tool to control excesses under the
police power. Enactment of regulatory programs within the accommodation
power framework assumes that the legislature has assessed their probable
costs and has made the policy judgment that, as a matter of fairness, the
public sector should either bear these costs or reduce them to a constitutionally
tolerable level by the variance route. Incursions on individual liberty will
certainly occur less frequently than under current practice. Further, the com
prehensive plan will be less vulnerable to hole-poking: this outcome will be
avoided altogether when compensation is afforded, and it will be held within
narrower bonds when, lacking compensatory resources, government instead
permits incremental density increases.
Left unremedied by my proposed resolution are the private losses incurred
between passage of a defective measure and a decision by the regulatory au
thority to forego the compensatory option. The decision to leave these losses
with the landowner is not reached lightly. Time truly is money for the real
225. See TAKING, supra note 5, 276, 279-83.
226. Empirical data on this question is scant because of the limited compensation

practice in the United States. Two possibly useful indicators of the probability of a
minimal claims response can be cited, however. First, the Massachusetts Coastal Wet
lands Act of 1965, 130 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 105 ( Supp. 1971 ) , authorizes local
governments to impose "coastal protective orders," which effectively prohibit any sub
stantial development activity in the area protected. Should a reviewing court agree with
a private challenge that a given order is confi scatory, it may grant the local govern
ment an option to cure the order through compensation. In a study of experience under
the act, Fred Bosselman and David Callies reported that while over "two thirds of
[the state' s] coastal wetlands [are] covered by protective orders . . . actual negotiations
have been required with only about 100 owners and . . . only one objection will come
to trial in the courts ; " F. BosSELMAN and D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND UsE CONTROL 225 ( 1 97 1 ) . Second, while municipal landmark ordinances typically
provide for a real estate tax reduction for designated landmark properties, a survey of
12 American cities conducted by the writer in 1970 indicated that such reductions had
been afforded in only one city and were seldom requested by landmark owners. See
Costonis, The Chicago Plan : Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urba1i Land
marks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 578 n.18 ( 1972) .
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2.

The A ccommodation Power : A Blueprint for Institutional Teamwork.

a.

The Legislatures. Primary responsibility for nurturing the accommo

dation power must rest with the legislature. Cognizant that desirable land
use programs can cast undue losses on some landowners, the legi slature should
backstop what is currently regarded as the police power dimension of these
programs with a compensatory supplement predicated o n the accommodation
power and fair compensation.
In addition to their status as program formulators, legislatures will have
other leadership functions . If local governments are to implement the program,
they will need some legal foundation to do so, such as an enabling act adopted
by the state legislature. Of the three departments of government, moreover,
the legislature is best fitted to define those community values which should
be protected through land use regimes, to assess the likely regulatory and fiscal
impacts of those regimes, and to devise appropriate compensatory formats
when necessary. I n addressing these issues, of course, they will also fix stan
dards that determine which private expectancies are "property," in the sense
227. For a breakdown of the dollar costs that developers i n Puerto Rico incur as a
receiving development approvals from the Puerto Rico Planning
Board, sec PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note 1 3, at 46-47.
228. Cf. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P . 2d 1345, 104 Cal . Rptr. 1
. ; Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
result of delays in

g����

229. An example of the stagger!ng liabi.lities that t�e government might incur appears
.
m the �aga of Grand Central Terminal, which was designated as a New York City land
mark m 1967. The predecessor to the Penn Central Corporation, the
site's present

.
.
owner, had entered mto a groundlease with a developer which anticipated construction
of a second Pa� American-type office building over the landmark and
called for annual
lease paxments m the order ?f $2.2 million. But construction
was barred by the New
.
York City Landmarks Comm1ss10n because of the Terminal'
s landmark status In 1975
a New York trial court declared the designation a taking. See
note 2 1 0 supra Assum ing
tha� damages for a tem o ary taking between 1 967 and
1 975 were calculated on the
p �
basis of the gr�:mndlease s mcome stream, they could run
upwards of $ 1 5 million See
gencra./ly H uxtable, Why Did We Lose Grand
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that their invasion requires compensation at all. This last determination will
also afford the kind · of guidance so long neglected and sorely needed for the
rational development of police and eminent domain doctrine generally.
b.

Administering and A dministrati-ve Agencies.

While some accommoda

tion power-based programs will be directly implemented by state or regional
entities, many will fall within the province of local governments. To the extent
that these local bodies prosecute such programs under general enabling acts,
they can be regarded as legislatures in t h e sense used here. City councils and
county boards of supervisors can be expected to delegate the programs' actual
administration to the entity referred to in the American Law Institute Model
Land Development Code as the "local land development agency."230 This
umbrella term includes existing plan commissions; urban renewal authorities,
landmark commissions, and the like. Because it will be the j ob of that agency
to implement legislative mandates in light of the circumstances in the pertinent
jurisdiction, it must be staffed with individuals knowledgeable in the legal,
planning and land economics-appraisal fields, and . it must receive forceful
political backing.
Administrative agencies may also serve as claims commi ssions. State and
regional agencies are more likely to carry out this function because their ad
ministrative staff's, resources and broader planning concerns permit a more
sophisticated and systematic treatment of private claims than would be feasible
for many local governments. While it might be inappropriate to vest both
program administration and claims adjudication functions in the same agency,
the separate agencies charged with these respective tasks should routinely
touch base with one another to coordinate the pertinent program's regulatory
and fiscal aspects.
c.

The Courts.

And then there are the courts. Their role in the compen

sation quandary has been so troubled that in fluential commentators have
urged that it be sharply de-emphasized, if not eliminated altogether.231 While
active legislative involvement of the type described above should .diminish
the courts' role considerably, it will not and, in my judgment, should not,
reduce them to bit players. The federal and state constitutions, after all, install
the courts as the ultimate arbiters of the c ompensation question, a mainstay
in contemporary land use litigation. As

Ramapo

and

Tudor Parks

confirm,

it is inevitable that accommodation power-based programs will come before
the courts, especially in the early years of that power's doctrinal elaboration.
The assessment of the judiciary's role found in the earlier discussion of those
cases232 will not be repeated here. Instead, this section closes with a critique
230. See CODE sttj>ra note 167, §§ 2-301 to -3 1 2.
231. See authorities cited note 121 supra.
232. See text accompanying notes 145-67, 195-210 supra.
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be hard to
a public use obj ection, the court also volunteered that " it would
say that the statute might not have been passed in the exercise of the police
power. "23 6

Emboldened

by that

dictum ,

the

Massachusetts

Legislature imposed

similar restrictions the following year o n parcels adjoining its capitol building
and provided for eminent domain damages only "if and i nsofar as the act and
proceedings to enforce it may deprive the (landowners ] of rights existing
under the constitution."237 In Parker v. Commonwea lt h , 2a 8 the State Attorney
General's demurrer to the landowners' petition for eminent domain damages
was sustained by the trial court . On review, the then -Chief Justice Holmes,
in his opinion for the Massachusetts Sup reme Judicial Court, stated that the
attorney general construed the statute "as importing an exercise of the police
power so far as the legislature could constitutionally go, and as saving a rem
edy for all damages beyond that point. "239 Without deciding whether the
measure was :valid under the police power, Holmes rejected this construction,
reasoning that :
w �ile we cai: gather that the legislature was willing to take anything
.
without paym� for it that this court should say that it could, we do
not find anythmg that even suggest s a legislative adj udication that
.
th� pubhc welfare requires that petitioners' property should be re
.
stricted without compensation t o them . 240
The defect in the attorney general' s position, according to Holmes, was that
the statute:
gives a r �me?y if the act deprives the parties of rights existing under
the constituti�:m. In the ab ence of a adjud cation by the Legislature
�
':1 .
th.at the public nee� s reqmre the pettt10ners
property to be restricted
":'1thout compensation, the �tatute does deprive t h e parties of such
nghts, and on the construction of the statute which
we adopt there
has been no such adjudication.u1

f

233. Attorney General v. Williams, 1 74 Mass . 476, 55 N E
Commonwealth, 1 �8 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 ( 1 901 ) .
.
234. In re Opm1on
of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 ( 1974) .
235. 1 74 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 ( 1899) .
236. Id. at 478, 55 N.E. at 77.
237. Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199' 203 59
N E
paraphrased by Holmes, C. J.).
·

'

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

204, 59 N.E. at 635.
204-05, 59 N.E. at 635.
205, 59 N.E. at 635.
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Accordingly, he remanded the action so that damages could be assessed and
awarded to the landowners.
The Parker result turned on

statutory construction

rather than on

constitutional grounds. Seventy-five years later in In Re Opinion of the Jus

tices,242 however, the Massachusetts S upreme Judicial Court hinted that such
a measure, inviting the court to determine whether or not there was a taking
and to fix appropriate eminent domain damages if there were, might run
afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. At issue in that advisory opinion
was the constitutionality of a clumsily drafted bill243 intended to provide public
access to the stretch of state coastline between the mean high water and
extreme low water line. Becau se a colonial legislature in 1649 had granted
title to this zone to littoral owners subject to a general reservation of public
rights, the Massachusetts Legislature was uncertain of the measure's status
under the police power. Wishing to insure public access even if it had to
compensate, the legislature authorized record owners of littoral property to
test the question under the state's condemnation statute and to be awarded
compensation should the court determine that the public rights reserved under
the 1649 act did not include beach access. Invalidating the 1974 measure
on a variety of grounds not pertinent here, the court also warned that the
legislature's forward pass to the j udiciary "raise [ s ]

serious constitutional

questions "2 H with respect to the separation of powers doctrine.

A critique of Parker and In Re Opinion of the Justices might best com
mence with the latter's hint that the legislative-judicial teamwork envisaged
under accommodation power-based programs encroaches on the separation of
powers doctrine. I n addition to those fundamental differences which allow
the beach access bill to be readily distinguished from the accommodation
power variants portrayed earlier, 245 the opinion affords on other grounds a
poorly reasoned basis for vetoing this teamwork. As the court viewed it, the
bill "attempts to transfer from the Legislature to the courts . . . the decision
whether or not to compensate, that is, whether or not to exercise the power
of eminent domain."246 Were this truly so, there would indeed be cause both
for constitutional concern and for doubts about a policy of allowing courts
rather than legislatures to allocate public resources. But the beach access bill
and, even more certainly, the accommodation power variants envisage noth242. 313 N.E.2d 561 ( 1974) .
243. An Act Authorizing Public Right-of-Passage Along Certain Coastlines of the
Commonwealth, House No. 481, reproduced in id. at 563-64.
244. 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 ( 1 974 ) .
245. The key difference is that the Massachusetts bill was facially unconstitutional,
see id. at 568, while accommodation power-based measures, such as the Tudor Parks TDR
program , if unconstitutional at all, will be so only in their application to specific properties.
See text accompanying notes 186-94 supra. A s a result of poor draftsmanship, moreover,
the Massachusetts bill was defective on a number of procedural due process grounds, see
In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N . E.2d 561, 569-71 ( 1974).
246. In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 ( 1 974 ) .
.
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ing of the sort. I n both instances, the legislature itself h a s alr eady made the
.
decision to award compensation if necessary to reach the des i red r gulatory

�

result. Recognizing that compensation may not be required i n border line cases
.
-witness the dictum in Attorney General v. Williams241-and b e mg prop
erly chary of the needless expenditure of scarce public r esources, the legis
lature has simply chosen to await a j u dicial determination of the measure's
adequacy before committing these resources. Under these circumstances, the
court is no more a party to violation of the separation o f powers doctrine
than it is in any run-of-the-mill eminent domain case.
In short, if it i s no violation of that doctrine for a court to adju dicate
these two issues in separate proceedings, why is it violated if a court deter
mines them in consolidated proceedings under circumstances in which the
legislature has already agreed that compensation be paid i f necessary ?
Taken at face value, moreover, the court's reasoning would directly im
pugn the constitutionality of inverse condemnation proceedings. These pro
ceedings address the same issues-whether the challenged public action is
sustainable under the police power and, if not, what compen sation is due
the private challenger_:without being tagged illegal . Yet, uncfer the court's
rationale, they are even more objectionable because they take place in a set
ting where the legislature not only has given no prior indication of its willing
ness to compensate but has instead indicated precisely t h e opposite.
If constitutional objections to legislative-judicial teamwork are spurious,
does the team work do violence to the j udiciary's status in any other cred ible
respect ? I think not. Holmes' opinion in Parker is elliptical in this regard,
resting instead on a narrow question of statutory interpretation. Yet even on
that level, the opinion dissembles. First, h e construes the 1 899 statute not to
be a "legislative adjudication that the public welfare requires that the [ land
should be restricted without compensation to them , " 24 8

owners' property]

and then he concedes that, under the statute, "the legislature is willing to
take anything without paying for it that the courts should say that it could . "249
Though made conditional on the outcome of subsequent j udicial review , it
is evident that the legislature did "adjudica te" that compensa tion
be paid
unless Holmes would have us believe that all condition al
propositions are
ambiguou s.

Although the reason for Holmes' strained con struction must remain a
matter of speculati on, the suggestio n is plausible that, because
Holmes and
the courts generally were imbued with the laisse
z-faire attitude of their
times,250 they were unlikely to be sympathetic to
innova tions like the 1 899

statute. Also, they were likely to be reluctant in
any event, t o become em,
247.
248.
249.
250.

See note 236 and accompanying text supra.
Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199 205 59 N .
E 634 635 ( 1 90 1 ) .
'
'
Id. at 204-05, 59 N.E. 634, 634-35 ( 1 901 ) .
See authority cited in note 48 supra.
.

'
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broiled in the type of fine-tuning that the legislature requested, when it
offered the court only a passing reference to "constitutional rights" to guide
it in resolving the taking question. Today, if not then, that reluctance is mis
conceived. Private rights are no longer accorded great deference when they
conflict with sound public goals. And, while both the complexity of the re
quired fine-tuning and the legislative default in aiding the courts continue,
a judicial retort of "After you, Alphonse" will only serve to perpetuate con
fused taking doctrine and, in the process, to condone unfair land use measures.
Whether they like it or not, courts are and will continue to be faced with
a plethora of actions challenging regulatory measures on confiscation grounds.
It would serve their interests, as well as those of regulatory authorities and
the private sector, to encourage legislative initiatives, such as accommodation
power-based programs, that afford a fair, rational and systematic judgmental
framework for dealing with the compensation question.

CONCLUSION
The Old Stock Exchange Building, a fragile business palace · marrying
grace with utility, stood proudly in the heart of Chicago's Loop in 197 1 . Con
ceived by Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler, the Exchange won national
and international acclaim as a gem of the Chicago School of Architecture,
which, at the turn of the century, created the foundations for modern archi
tectural design and engineering. Though fully rented and a profitable office
building in 1 968, the Exchange was chastised in 197 1 by its new owners, a
development syndicate, as economically unviable. The developers then gave
substance to their charge by refusing to renew the leases of the building's
tenants. Spurred on by the easy availability of mortgage financing and the
rash of construction that was then adding five million square feet of office
space annually to Chicago's totaLinventory of 6()-million square feet, they had
little use for the 13-story Exchange when Chicago's zoning permitted upwards
of a 40-story building on the site. Despite the eleventh-hour efforts of the
press, citizens groups and others to bring the Exchange under the limited
protection of the city's preservation ordinance, the city council refused to go
along-lest the Exchange, in the words of one Daley alderman, become known
as "Chicago's White Elephant."251 The building was torn down in 1972, a
casualty of market forces.
But the story does not end there. Shortly after completion of the Ex
change's pedestrian, 43-story replacement in · 1975, the developers sought a
court-sanctioned financial reorganization because the new building, they said,
251. See Committee on Cultural and Economic Development of the Chicago City
Council, Special Report Relative to Designation of the Old Stock Exchange Building at
6, 1970.
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was "economically unviable. "252 Like many other developers in Chicago and
other American cities during the late 60's and early 70's, they had badly mis
read the market, and had failed to see that it would soon be glutted by the
construction orgy then going on ; as a result, two-thirds of their new building
was left untenanted.
The terrible irony of this tale recurs again and again, not only for land
mark buildings, but for other man-made and natural amenities. To this ob
server, the near-bankruptcy of the Exchange's developers is dwarfed by the
larger social bankruptcy that market fatalism portends. But tragic as the loss
of the Exchange and other amenities surely are, they do not warrant the
emasculation of constitutional constraints against governmental overreaching
either, in my judgment. These losses, instead, proclaim two clear messages.
First is our urgent need for a fresh look at current property conceptions,
whose inertness all but guarantees mindless repetition of the Stock Exchange
debacle. Second is the need to preclude future debacles by transforming our
legal and institutional arrangements so they can accommodate the tensions
between the dictates of fairness and of effective public governance.
These tensions, gratuitously inflamed by the current police power/emi
nent domain deadlock, are the subject of this article. The necessity for recog
nition of the accommodation power and fair compensation is its thesis. Pre
vention of the irony recounted in the Old Stock Exchange tale is its goal.
Bonding these elements together is the underlying conviction-and a greater
irony still-that government has at hand the means for resolving these ten
sions but, immobilized by doctrinal rigidities, doesn't seem to know it.
252. See Warden, Trouble Plagues New Loop Building, Chicago Daily News, Jan.
23, 1975 at 1 , col. 1.

